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Extremist groups' use of powerfultechniques of coercive persua-
sion ("brainwashing")" to produce obedient followers raises per-
* Professor of Law, UCLA; Visiting Professor, UC-Davis. J.D., University of California,
Berkeley, 1974.
"Coercive persuasion" is a term used by social psychologists and psychiatrists to de-
scribe forcibly induced changes in belief and value orientation. Eg., Peterson v. Sorlien, 299
N.W.2d 123, 126 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981) (defining coercive persua-
sion); R. LIPTON, THOUGHT REFoRM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ToTALIsm (1961); . SCHEI,
COERCIVE PERSUASION (1961). In general, coercive persuasion has been studied in two set-
tings: (i) field studies of prisoners of war, victims of Chinese "revolutionary universities,"
captives of outlaw groups, and religious cults; and (ii) laboratory studies of isolation, physio-
logical depletion, peer pressure, and cognitive dissonance. For examples of the former, see E.
SCHEIN, supra; Lifton, Home By Ship: Reaction Patterns of American Prisoners of War
Repatriated from North Korea, 110 ABL J. PSYCHIATRY 732 (1954); Schein, The Chinese
Indoctrination Program for Prisoners of War, 19 PSYCHIATRY 149 (1956); Strassman, Thaler,
& Schein, A Prisoner of War Syndrome: Apathy as a Reaction to Severe Stress, 112 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 998 (1956); J. Segal, Therapeutic Considerations in Planning the Return of
American Prisoners of War to Continental United States (U. S. Navy, Neuropsychiatric Re-
search Unit, Rep. No. 72-37) (1973). See also V. BUGLIOSI & C. Gnmxry, HuTaxa SmELErn
(1974) (trial of Manson cultists); J. IEERLO, RAPE OF THE MIND (1956); W. SARGANT, BATTLE
FOR THE MIND 91-158 (1957) (religious conversion); THE TRIAL OF PAY HEARST (1976) (re-
print of trial transcript) [hereinafter cited as HEARST TRIAL]; Delgado, Religious Totalism:
Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion under the First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1977),
and sources cited therein (psychologists and psychiatrists describe emotional effects of
membership in religious cult groups) [hereinafter cited as Delgado, Religious Totalism]. For
examples of the latter type of study, see, e.g., L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF CoGNITIE DIsso-
NANCE 84-97 (1957); Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: L A Minority of One
Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOLOGY MONOGRAPHS No. 416 (1956); Chodoff, Ef-
fects of Extreme, Coercive & Oppressive Forces, in 3 AMER. HANDBOOK OF PSYcHITRY 384
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plexing issues of criminal responsibility,2 free will,s and the limits
of governmental intervention.' At times, such conditioning has
been raised defensively, as in the trials of Patty Hearst5 and Larry
Layton," and the courts-martial of returning POWs.7 At other
(S. Arieti ed. 1966); Lilly, Mental Effects of Reduction of Ordinary Levels of Physical Stim-
uli on Intact Healthy Persons, 5 PSYCH. REs. REP. 1 (1956); Milgram, Some Conditions of
Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 18 HUM. REL. 57 (1965); Milgram, Group Pres-
sure and Action Against a Person, 69 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 137 (1964); Group for the
Advancement of Psychiatry, Symposium No. 3: Factors Used to Increase the Susceptibility
of Individuals to Forceful Indoctrination 90-93 (1956); id., Symposium No. 2: Illustrative
Strategies for Research on Psychopathology in Mental Health 14, 18-20, 98-103 (1956). See
also Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use
of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 237 (1974) (summarizing capabilities of physically
controlling behavior of captive populations).
Although there is some disagreement over the theoretical model that best accounts for the
mental and emotional changes of brainwashing, there is substantial agreement that concen-
trated application of certain techniques facilitates them. The techniques include: (1) isola-
tion of the victim and control over his environment; (2) control over information and com-
munication; (3) physiological depletion through inadequate sleep, diet, and sanitation; (4)
repetitious tasks, singing, and chanting; (5) manipulation of guilt and anxiety; (6) threats of
annihilation, physical or spiritual, for failure to identify with the captors; (7) degradation of
and assaults on the self; (8) peer pressure, often applied through "struggle sessions"; (9)
forced acts of self-betrayal and betrayal of former group norms; (10) alternation of harsh-
ness and kindness. See generally Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Minn. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981); Delgado, Ascription of Criminal States of Mind: Toward
a Defense Theory for the Coercively Persuaded ("Brainwashed") Defendant, 63 MINN. L.
REv. 1, 2-3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Delgado, Ascription].
I It has been argued that persons who have undergone involuntary subjection to a regime
of forceful conversion should be entitled to a defense to criminal charges arising from acts
induced by the conversion. E.g., Delgado, Ascription, supra note 1; Lunde & Wilson, Brain-
washing as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Patty Hearst Revisited, 13 CiuM. L. BULL. 341
(1977). See also cases cited notes 5-7 infra.
3 Compare Delgado, Ascription, supra note 1, with Dressier, Professor Delgado's "Brain-
washing" Defense: Courting a Determinist Legal System, 63 MINN. L. Rv. 335 (1979) (de-
fense of coercive persuasion incompatible with free-will premise of criminal justice system).
4 E.g., Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1 (intervention permissible); Comment,
"Mind Control" or Intensity of Faith: The Constitutional Protection of Religious Beliefs,
13 HAEv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 751 (1978) (middle-of-the-road position); Note, Conservator-
ships and Religious Cults: Divining a Theory of Free Exercise, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1247
(1978) (intervention not permissible).
I United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863, 866, 880, 883.84 (N.D. Cal. 1976); HEARST
TRIAL, supra note 1. See also Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Minn. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981) (young woman's coercive persuasion at hands of religious cults
justified her forcible deprogramming; defense of "consent" upheld); see notes 147-59 and
accompanying text infra.
United States v. Layton, 519 F. Supp. 942, 946, 959 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
E.g., United States v. Olson, 20 C.M.R. 461 (A.C.M.R. 1955), aff'd, 7 C.M.A. 460, 22
C.M.R. 250 (1957); United States v. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452 (A.C.M.R. 1954), aff'd, 7
C.M.A. 354, 22 C.M.R. 144 (1956); United States v. Fleming, 19 C.M.R. 438 (A.C.M.R.
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times, allegations of coercive persuasion have induced state action,
such as legislation8 or court orders9 aimed at prohibiting or revers-
ing extreme forms of conditioning.
Earlier commentary has explored the criminal responsibility of
the coercively persuaded defendant,o as well as numerous
problems raised by proposals to regulate the proselytizing and con-
version activity of "cult" 1  groups like the Unification Church,
1954), afTd, 7 C.MA. 543, 23 C.M.R. 7 (1957). See also N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1954, at 16, coL
3 (prosecution of Col. Schwable not brought because of finding of intense pressures applied
during captivity).
1 E.g., New York State Assembly, Public Hearing on Treatment of Children by Cults
(Amer. Fain. Foundation Reprint, Aug. 9-10, 1979) [hereinafter cited as New York Hear-
ings]; Hearings, Vermont Senate Comm. for Investigation of Alleged Deceptive, Fraudu-
lent and Criminal Practices of Various Organizations in the State (Aug. 18, 1976) [herein-
after cited as Vermont Hearings]; STAFF REPORT, INvEsTIGATI E GROUP TO TrE CoM r
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE ASSASSINATION OF REPRESENTA-
Triv LEo J. RYAN AND THE JONEsTowN, GUYANA TRAGEDY, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as JONESTOWN REPORT]. See also Note, High Demand Sects: Disclosure
and the Free Exercise Clause, 15 NEw ENG. L. Rv. 128 (1979) (proposing disclosure
legislation).
I E.g., In re Surber, No. G-946 (Ariz., Pima County, Super. CL Oct. 24, 1975); In re Petri,
No. NCP 5267B (Cal., L. County, Super. CL Mar. 1, 1976). But see Comment, To Keep
Them Out of Harm's Way? Temporary Conservatorships and Religious Sects, 66 CALIF. L.
REv. 845 (1978) (criticizing use of conservatorships to "deprogram" religious cultists).
10 E.g., Delgado, Ascription, supra note 1; Dressier, supra note 3; Lunde & Wilson, supra
note 2.
', The term "cult" is used herein nonpejoratively, ie., in its dictionary sense, "a system of
religious worship or ritual... devoted attachment to, or extravagant admiration for, a per-
son, principle, etc. ... [A] group of followers; sect." WEsTEa's Nnw WORLD DICTIONRY
358 (college ed. 1966).
The major religious cults are identified and described in J. RuniN & M. RUDIN, PRSON oR
PARADISE: THE NEW RELIGIOUS CULTS 31-97 (1980) (Unification Church, Krishna Conscious-
ness, The Way, Alamo Foundation, Divine Light Mission, Church of Armageddon/Love
Family, Children of God, and Church of Scientology). It was recently estimated that one to
three million U.S. citizens are members of such groups. Briggs, New Spiritual Organizations
Considered Likely to Last, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1977, at A15, col. 1; Religious Cults: New-
est Magnet for Youth, U.S. NEws & WoRD REP., June 14, 1976, at 52 (Gallup poll suggests
six million Americans have had some contact with transcendental meditation, three million
with charismatic renewal, three million with "mysticism," and two million with "Oriental
religions."). See also Beckford, A Korean Evangelistic Movement in the West, in Acts of the
12th International Conf. for the Sociology of Religion 319, 321-23 (1973) (Unification
Church has branches in all European countries and has large following in Korea and Japan);
Davis & Richardson, A More Honest and Objective Look at the Children of God, in Soc'y
for the Scientific Study of Religion, Annual Meeting 1 (1975) (Children of God cult operates
in over 65 countries); Address by Paul B. Rose, Member of Parliament, Official Record (Oct.
22, 1975) (growing concern over Unification Church activities in England).
The recent growth of cultism in the Western world perhaps can be explained as the prod-
uct of rapid social change and resulting anxiety among members of society. Eg., J. CLARE,
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People's Temple, and The Way.12 This Article analyzes one aspect
of the latter controversy-the proposal to recognize a requirement
of disclosure in religious conversion' s similar to that imposed in
medicine and human experimentation." ' Under the proposed rule,
religious proselytizers would be free to convert, indoctrinate, and
condition members of the public only after disclosing certain infor-
mation to them, and obtaining their assent. As with informed con-
sent requirements in general, the principal aim of such a rule is to
strike a balance between the legitimate interests of converters,
and the rights of potential converts to select their own religion or
nonreligion.
Values of self-determination already play a significant role in the
debate about religious cultism. On a rhetorical level, defenders of
these groups ask why young adults should not be free to join
whatever religious organizations they desire. 6 Opponents respond
that free choice is exactly what these groups deny.17 Constitutional
analysis of state intervention raises consent issues,18 as do tort and
M. LAGONE, R. ScHEcr , & R. DALY, DESTRUCTIVE CULT CONVERSION: THEORY, RESEARCH
AND TREATMENT 44 (1981) (loss of "cultural confidence") [hereinafter cited as DEsTRucTIVE
CULT CONVERSION]; West & Delgado, Psyching out the Cults' Collective Mania, Los Angeles
Times, Nov. 26, 1978, pt. VII, at 1 (cults' growth fastest in periods of social transition).1$ See note 4 supra.
'3 An informed consent requirement was suggested in Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra
note 1, at 50-61, 73-74. See also Note, supra note 8 (proposing statutory disclosure remedy).
N The doctrine of informed consent in medicine and human experimentation requires
that the physician or experimenter describe the proposed treatment in advance and obtain
the subject's consent. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
514 (1972); J. KATz, EXPERIMENTATION wrrH HUMAN BEINGS 540-608 (1972). Generally, the
doctor must disclose all material information that the patient likely would need to make an
intelligent decision, including the diagnosis, prognosis, alternative treatments and their
costs and risks.
1 See text accompanying notes 167-224 infra.
6 E.g., Gutman, Extemporaneous Remarks, 9 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 69, 71
(1979); Robbins, Religious Movements, The State and the Law: Reconceptualizing "The
Cult Problem," 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 33 (1979).
17 E.g., A. RUDIN & M. RUDIN, PRISON OR PARADISE? THE NEW RELIGIOUS CULTS (1980);
Conway & Siegelman, Information Disease: Have Cults Created a New Mental Illness?, Sci.
DI., Jan. 1982, at 86; Rudin, The Cult Phenomenon: Fad or Fact?, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 17 (1979).
18 First amendment analysis requires that governmental interests of the highest order jus-
tify any official measure that impinges on religious liberty. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 215 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 407 (1963). Although some of the
interests advanced in the cult controversy are broad, societal ones-danger to the family as
an institution, or the risk of violence, see, e.g., Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at
[Vol. 16:533
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criminal actions brought by cult members after unsuccessful
deprogrammings,19 and suits by ex-members against cult leaders
for unlawful imprisonment, slavery, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and fraud.20
This Article argues that these autonomy values, already invoked
by both sides of the debate, should be extended and institutional-
ized in the form of a requirement of informed consent to religious
conversion. First, it will show that such a requirement is necessary
to prevent injury to specific interests of converts, as well as plausi-
ble, in that the context in which it is proposed recognizes and pro-
tects disclosure and freedom-of-choice values. It explains why such
a requirement has not been developed, and why it is appropriate
for it to be recognized now. A composite model of the cult-joining
process, drawn from descriptions of the recruiting practices of cult
groups, is then put forth and analyzed to identify the points where
consent problems arise. Final sections consider the remedies avail-
able to enforce an informed consent requirement, possible objec-
tions to such a requirement, and answers to those objections.
I. NECESSITY AND PLAUSmILrrY OF AN INFORMED CONSENT
REQUIREMENT
Proponents of an informed consent requirement in a novel area
should be able to show: (1) that the requirement is needed to avoid
injury to legally protected interests; (2) that autonomy values are
recognized in the setting in which the requirement is urged; and
(3) that the current absence of such a requirement does not imply
26-36--the majority of the interests concern only the individual victim, eg., id. at 10-25
(precipitation of psychiatric disorders; guilt, suicide, and self-mutilation; maturational ar-
rest; physical disease and injury, and impairment of autonomy). Our legal system is averse
to describing as a "harm" an event that the victim incurs voluntarily or does not perceive as
a harm. See generally, id. at 49-62. It is therefore necessary to assess the extent to which
the subjects of cultic recruiting and conditioning undergo them willingly and consensually.
Id. (limitations on the decisions to join based on voluntariness).
" E.g., United States v. Patrick, No. CR-74-320-S (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 1974); Peterson
v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
20 E.g., United States v. Carr, No. CR-79-195-D (M.D.N.C. filed Oct. 31, 1979) (three
members of the Church of God and True Holiness pled guilty to charges of holding church
members in state of slavery); Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (DIL 1978)
(unsuccessful civil action by ex-member for damages for maintaining her in involuntary ser-
vitude); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, - P.2d - (Or. App. 1982) (reversing and
remanding $1,500,000 judgment for fraud and outrageous conduct); Dettling, Husband
Awarded $400,000 in Cult Suit, Akron Beacon J., July 16, 1977, § A, at 3, col 1.
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a social judgment that it should not exist.
A. Harms That May Be Averted by Means of an Informed Con-
sent Requirement
Psychological studies, legislative hearings, civil and criminal ac-
tions, and first-person accounts by former cultists indicate that a
number of harms may befall members of these groups. These in-
clude: physical injury from malnutrition, inadequate sleep, over-
work, and inattention to medical needs; 21 pecuniary loss;22 psycho-
logical injury, including guilt, suicide, maturational arrest,
psychosis and neurosis;23 impairment of autonomy and decisional
2 New York Hearings, supra note 8, at 11-12 (child abuse); id. pt. II at 117-18, 175-77
(deaths, beatings, malnutrition); Vermont Hearings, supra note 8, at 16 (extreme sleep dep-
rivation), 43-45 (hepatitis untreated because Satan, not germs, caused disease), 63 (low-pro-
tein, high-carbohydrate diet); JONESTOWN REPORT, supra note 8, at 17-18; R. ENROTI,
YOUTH, BRAINWASHING AND THE EXTREmIST CULTS 64 (1977) (80-100 members living in ro-
dent-infested house, but "these discomforts were. . . to make us strong"); id. at 88-89 (elec-
tric current from wall socket transmitted among circle of members holding hands, as test of
faith); id. at 125 (deaths from ritual inhalation of toluene); C. STONER & A. PARKE, ALL
GOD'S CHILDREN 106-08 (1978) (starving cult members during cold winter told "to meditate
and concentrate on each grain of rice"; one member who lost 40 pounds explained that
drugs sustained them through the winter); id. at 138 (medical treatments rejected as non-
spiritual). See also People v. Florence, No. 8699, People v. Patrick, No. 8688, People v.
Sacks, No. 8686, record at 27 (Cal., Fullerton Co. Mun. Ct. May 6, 1975) (offer of proof of
defendants, reciting that Hare Krishna follower, after working in streets, fainted in presence
of mother; on reviving declared that her body consisted of nothing but stool and urine and
was of no concern to her); National Ad Hoc Committee, The Unification Church: Its Activi-
ties and Practices, A Meeting of Concerned Parents, A Day of Affirmation and Protest
(transcript of meeting held by Senators Dole and Buckley, in Washington, D.C., April 30,
1976) [hereinafter cited as Dole-Buckley Meeting Report]; id. pt. 1, at 25 (loss of sensation
in feet and toes from long hours of proselytizing); id. pt. 2, at 11 (untreated eye condition);
id. at 15, 54 (untreated ovarian cyst so large woman appeared pregnant), 61 (improperly set
broken limb); Conway & Siegelman, supra note 17, at 88 (extreme weight gain or loss; men.
strual dysfunction in women, loss of secondary sex characteristics in men; malnutrition; ab-
normal skin conditions).
The physiological depletion suffered by cult members may be compared with that exper-
ienced by POW and concentration camp victims. See, e.g., J. SEGAL, LoNo-TERmi PsYcno-
LOGICAL AND PHYSICAL EFFECTS OF THE POW EXPERIENCE: A REviEW OF THE LITERATURE 8-27
(1973) (robotization of emotions, premature aging, loss of menstrual function, suicide, psy-
chiatric disorders); Chodoff, supra note 1; Sargant & Shorvon, Acute War Neurosis, 54
ARCHIvES OF NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 231, 236 (1945).
JONESTOWN REPORT, supra note 8, at 18; Conway & Siegelman, supra note 17, at 88
("modest sample donated more than $1.3 million of their own savings and possessions...
average gift- $3,250 ... and brought in another $5.7 million); Delgado, Religious Totalism,
supra note 1, at 44-45 (cults require members to donate all material possessions to group).
2 American Psychiatric Association, Comm. on Nomenclature and Statistics, Diagnostic
538
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capacity;2 and loss of opportunity by the convert for normal per-
sonal, career, and social development.2 5
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, disorder 300.15, at 260 (3d ed. 1980) ("persons
who have been subjected to periods of prolonged and intense coercive persuasion... while
the captive of terrorists or cultists") [hereinafter cited as DSMMD MI]; New York Hearings,
supra note 8, at 11-13, 29 (psychological and emotional abuse of children); id. pt. H, at 66-
67 (suicide); id. pt. HI, at 7-11 (child abuse in Jonestown); Vermont Hearings, supra note 8,
at 13, 17 (testimony of John Clarke, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School)
(classic psychotic or neurotic disease; impairment of reality testing;, stereotyped speech and
thought); DEsmucTv CuLT CONvERSION, supra note 11, at 5, 16, 17, 20-22 R. ENromT,
supra note 21, at 74 (self-mortification to purge self of sins, including five-day fasts); C.
STONER & A. PARKE, supra note 21, at 218 (robot-like writing); Conway & Siegelman, supra
note 17, at 88, 90, 92 (disturbances of awareness, perception, and memory; recurring night-
mares; hallucinations and delusions; inability to think and make decisions; suppression of
imagination); Cultism and the Young, FRoNTrrss OF PSYCHIATRY, Sept 1, 1976, at 2, col. 2
(psychological regression) [hereinafter cited as FRoNTIERs OF PsYCHUIATY]; Water, Tammy
Doesn't Live Here Anymore, BOSTON MAG., Nov. 1975, at 99 (immersing hands into snow
"until tlhey couldn't feel any longer"); Dole-Buckley Meeting Report, supra note 21, pt. 1, at
33 (schizophrenia or borderline psychosis resulting from cult experience); id. pt. 2, at 7, 14,
57, 71 (guilt manipulation); Transcript, NBC "Weekend," May 17, 1975 (youth at Unifica-
tion Church training center committed suicide by lying down on tracks in path of oncoming
train).
The psychological and maturational effects of the cult experience are similar to thee ob-
served in POW concentration camp cases. See, e.g., R. LwrN, THOUGHT REFORM AND Tim
PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALM: A STUDY OF "BRAiNwAsHING" IN CHINA (1961); Bettelheim, Indi-
vidual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations, 38 J. ABNORMA & SOc. PsYcHoLoGY 417,
444-47 (1943) (POWs regressed to infantile states); Farber, Harlow, & West, Brainwashing,
Conditioning and DDD (Debility, Dependency and Dread), 20 SocioAray 271, 275 (1957)
(creation of regressed states); Klonoff, McDougall, Clark, Kramer, & Horgan, The Neuro-
psychological, Psychiatric, and Physical Effects of Prolonged and Severe Stress: 30 Years
Later, 163 J. NERvous & MENrAL DISEASE 246, 248 (1976).
14 E.g., DEsmuc=v CULT CONVERSION, supra note 11, at 21-23 (impaired decisionmaking
ability;, paralysis of the will); Conway & Siegelman, supra note 17, at 90 ("1 felt broken,
shattered and terrified"; "it hurts to think, physically aches"; "was taught to think of my
mind as the enemy"); Dole-Buckley Meeting Report, supra note 21, pt. II, at 27, 34, 62
(normal, high-achieving youths turned into submissive "zombies," unable to make decisions
unaided), 14, 18, 27, 32, 45, 62, 64 (glassy-eyed stare, fixed smile, programmed-sounding
speech; stereotyped, robot-like responses; dullness; loss of emotional responsiveness);
DSMMD II, supra note 23 (recognizing cultic thought reform syndrome).
These responses, too, may be compared with those encountered in the POW syndrome.
See, e.g., Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination and Exploitation of American Military
and Civilian Prisoners: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the
Senate Comm. on Government Operation, 84th Cong., 2d Seas. 25 (1956) (dullness, fatigue,
loss of mental clarity); J. MNDsZENTY, MEMOmS 105, 110, 112-14 (1974) (Roman Catholic
Cardinal reported confusion, indifference, loss of reality after prolonged interrogation and
severe beatings at hands of Communist captors). See generally Schein, Reaction Patterns to
Severe Chronic Stress in American Army Prisoners of War of the Chinese, 13 J. Soc. Is-
sues No. 3, at 21-30 (1957).
5 E.g., New York Hearings, supra note 8, at 18-21, pt. II at 118, 122; JoNEsrowN REPORT,
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Not every cultist suffers these harms, or regards them as such.
Some thrive under the demands of cult life; others rise to positions
of leadership, where they wield influence and power over religious
empires. Many find contentment, even joy in the group and view
any costs associated with their conversion as acceptable.2 Others,
however, leave cult life-voluntarily, by expulsion, or by forcible
retrieval and deprogramming-sick, angry, and disillusioned.
2
7
Many state that, had they known of the group's identity or nature,
they would not have joined.2 8
These risks, comparable in many ways to those of nonconsensual
medical treatment or human experimentation, 9 suggest the need
for similar legal protection. Informed consent rules exist, in part,
to protect persons against risk.30 The existence of risk in religious
conversion is thus one ground in favor of such a rule in that
setting.
B. The Setting-Insiders, Outsiders, and the Government
It is necessary next to examine the setting in which a disclosure/
supra note 8, at 18; C. STONER & A. PARKE, supra note 21, at 5-31, 121-33; Dole-Buckley
Meeting Report, supra note 21, pt. 2, at 11, 14, 24, 36, 62 (marriage partners chosen; careers
abandoned; college education discontinued). See generally Conway & Siegelman, supra note
17, at 90 (lasting health problems, long-term emotional difficulties; 14% suffered severe cog.
nitive disorders lasting up to eight years); Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 44-
45.
26 E.g., DEsmucrIvn CULT CONVERSION, supra note 11, at 6 (personality changes conse-
quent to cult joining vary from one individual to another; effect is a complex interaction
among milieu, pre-existing personality, and treatment by fellow cultists).
" E.g., New York Hearings, supra note 8, at 27-28; DEsTRuorIvE CULT CONVERSION, supra
note 11, at 18-23 (psychological problems of ex-members); Conway & Siegelman, supra note
17, at 88, 90 (lasting effects of cult membership; full rehabilitation required up to eight
years, with average time more than 16 months. "My life was blown to bits by the experience
... I never knew such bewilderment, pain, and feeling on the brink of insanity."); Delgado,
Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 10-16 (psychological illness resulting from cult affilia-
tion) 16-17 (guilt, anger, depression).
1 New York Hearings, supra note 8, at 22-23, 34, 50; id. pt. II, at 26-27; Conway & Sie-
gelman, supra note 17, at 38-41.
" Patients or experimental subjects may suffer physical or psychological harm and expe-
rience mortification on learning the nature of the experiment or treatment. See generally J.
KATz, EXPERIMENTATION WrrH HUMAN BEINGS (1972). Informed consent requirements are
designed to permit subjects to decide for themselves whether to incur the former type of
risk and to eliminate the latter completely.
" See generally Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243-44, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10, 104 Cal. Rptr.
505, 513-14 (1972) (informed consent requirement for medical procedures exists to permit
patients to choose to incur or not incur risks).
540
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consent requirement is proposed to see whether it is consistent
with the values recognized therein. In some settings, an informed
consent requirement would be inappropriate or pointless,"' while
in others, important interests in physical or psychological integrity
are at stake, making such a requirement both plausible and
desirable.2
Values of self-determination are deeply rooted in our societal
views and legal treatment of religion. Although some religions
stress passive values such as faith, suspension of disbelief, and un-
critical discipleship,33 the legal system has always required that re-
ligions treat each person as though commitment to membership is
an affirmative act that is his or hers alone to make.
The early framers saw religious freedom in these terms.3 For
example, in drafting the preamble to Virginia's statute on religious
freedom, Jefferson wrote: "God made man's mind free, and delib-
erately chose that religion should be propagated by reason and not
by coercion."35 Locke, whose writings strongly influenced the early
colonists, regarded freedom of choice as an essential ingredient of
religious liberty. He characterized religion as "the inward persua-
sion of the mind,"36 and a church as a "voluntary society of men,
joining themselves together of their own accord.
37
Modern case law also protects truth-telling in religious matters,
although the scope of required disclosure varies. Some recent cases
treat religiously motivated deception no differently from ordinary
fraud, perhaps on the theory that fraudulent behavior cannot be
31 Informed consent would serve no purpose in situations that present no threat to sef-
determination or autonomy interests. Consider, e.g., a proposal to require a child's consent
to receive education; a proposal to require an adult's consent to be greeted by his or her
friends.
- See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972) (doctrine of
informed consent exists to safeguard patient's interest in self-determination and to avoid
unwanted intrusions on personal integrity).
-See, e.g., J. KNox, WoRKs OF JOHN KNOX (D. Laing, ed. 1895); J. CALviN, CommN'A-
rms (1979); AL BuBER, BErwN MAN AND N N (1965); see also note 134 infra.
L. PEFFE, CHURCH, STATE Arm FRunom 147, 610 (1967) (freedom to disbelieve and to
attack religion); W. SwFEr, RLIGION I COLONIAL AMmICm 339 (1942) (Madison urged pro-
tection of freedom of religion to promote a "multiplicity of sects").
J. BLAu, CoRusToNEs OF RELIoous FaFz.oM IN AMIUcA 74-75, 78-79 (1949).
J. LocKE, A Lmu CONCERNING TOLERATION 17-18 (1950).
3 Id. at 20.
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religious.3 8 Other cases apply a "sincerity" test, under which reli-
gious persons or groups may utter falsehoods if they sincerely be-
lieve that the utterances constitute religious truth. 9 A middle-of-
the-road position, illustrated by Founding Church of Scientology
v. United States,40 probably represents the majority view in in-
sider-outsider dealings.41 Founding Church concerned the FDA's
seizure of allegedly mislabeled E-meters42 used by the organization
for "clearing" adherents. The court found that: "[I]n order to raise
a religious defense to a charge of false statement [here misbrand-
ing], the person charged with the alleged misrepresentation must
have explicitly held himself out as making religious as opposed
to medical, scientific or otherwise secular, claims."'4 Thus,
Scientology was permitted to market E-meters, and to make exag-
gerated claims for their therapeutic efficacy, so long as it did so in
religious terms. If the Church had marketed the devices in secular
terms-had failed to hold itself out as a religion-the mislabeling
would have been punishable."
Case law concerning insider-insider relations shows a less sus-
tained concern over exploitation and nondisclosure, perhaps be-
cause members are deemed to have impliedly consented to normal
transactions within the group. Even here, however, courts have de-
veloped doctrine to protect church members against overreaching
by persons in leadership positions. Holding religious advisors to be
"fiduciaries,"' 5 courts have carefully examined gifts, wills, and
other transfers of property by members that inured to the leaders'
" United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1965); see United Methodist Council
v. Superior Court, 439 U.S. 1369, 1372-73 (1978); see also notes 196-97 and accompanying
text infra.
3, United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Bal-
lard, 310 U.S. 78 (1944).
40 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
4' For discussion of insider-outsider fraud, see generally L. TRIBE, AmERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 14-11, at 861-62 (1978); Weiss, Privilege, Posture, and Protection: "Religion"
in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593 (1964).
42 E-meters are primitive galvanometers used by Scientology to detect an emotional reac-
tion by an individual undergoing conditioning.
43 409 F.2d at 1164.
" Id. at 1162.
5 E.g., Caspari v. First German Church of the New Jerusalem, 82 Mo. 649 (1884), af'g 12





In church-government cases centering around various types of
religious exemption, courts have also imposed requirements of
honesty and disclosure. Thus, schooling,'7 drug,'8 tax," and selec-
tive service"0 decisions hold that, to qualify for an exemption, a
religious group or adherent must possess the requisite belief sin-
cerely and not merely as a cover to gain the desired benefit.
A small body of authority suggests that a right against imposed
religiosity exists independent of any physical or psychological
harm that might result from it. In Campbell v. Cauthron," for ex-
ample, inmates in a penal institution had been exposed to volun-
teer religious witnesses on Saturday and Sunday. Permitted to
enter the prison by the administration, the witnesses sang, prayed,
and preached to their captive audience. The Eighth Circuit for-
bade these practices, holding that "[florced inculcation ... even
by volunteer witnesses, would . . . contravene the Free Exercise
Clause.15 2 Prison officials were required to "take steps ... to
insure that no inmate is subjected to forced religious
indoctrination." 53
Forced-expression cases, decided under other portions of the
first amendment, also suggest that nonconsensual inculcation of re-
ligious values is constitutionally offensive. Recent examples are
Wooley v. Maynard,54 which struck down a statute under which a
state's motto ("Live Free or Die") was inscribed on every automo-
bile license plate, and Torcaso v. Watkins,55 which held unconsti-
tutional an oath of office requiring an affirmation of God. School
46 See note 45 supra.
47 E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972).
4$ E.g., Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395
U.S. 6 (1969); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
49 See Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127, 129 (D.C. Cir.
1957); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 692-93, 315
P.2d 394, 406 (1957).
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
"1 623 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1980).
52 Id. at 509.
3Id.
5 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
-367 U.S. 488 (1961). See also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946) (allowing
public reimbursement to parents of funds to transport children to Catholic schools); Board
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding mandatory flag salute3 unconstitutional
as applied to children whose religious beliefs forbade saluting "graven images").
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District of Abington Township v. Schempp"6 declared, in dictum,
that the government may not invade the "citadel of the individual
heart and mind, ' 57 either to aid or oppose religion. Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts" refused to permit religious evangelists to force their
children to accompany them during street proselytizing, in part be-
cause the children were too young to make religious choices for
themselves.5 9 Although one must be cautious against overgeneraliz-
ing based on dicta in first amendment cases,60 these decisions sug-
gest that the right of an individual to make choices in matters of
religious affiliation and belief is entitled to constitutional protec-
tion. If so, an informed consent requirement would be an obvious
and natural way of guarding that right.
C. Current Absence of an Informed Consent Requirement
The proponent of an informed consent requirement in a novel
setting must not only show that the requirement is plausible and
helpful, but also that society has not already considered and im-
pliedly rejected it. It might be argued that, if a requirement of in-
formed consent to religious conversion were desirable, it would al-
ready exist-religions and conversions have been part of human
experience for thousands of years.
Two considerations, however, suggest that this negative infer-
ence should not be drawn. First, until recently, religious groups re-
cruited relatively openly and honestly. It is unlikely that an early
Christian, a Renaissance-era Catholic, or a contemporary evangeli-
cal could have been inducted without knowing that the group he or
she was joining was religious. 61 This is no longer true of all
groups.6 2 Moreover, if a traditional-type religious recruiter misrep-
resented his or her cause, the problem had a simple solution: the
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
57 Id. at 226.
-321 U.S. 158 (1944).
51 "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they
are free... to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age... when
they can make that choice for themselves." Id. at 170.
60 See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 41, ch. 14, at 812-85 (indicating mercurial, context-
sensitive nature of religious liberty cases, especially in the last two decades).
11 E.g., W. JAMES, THE VARmTIs OF RELIGIOUS EXPEMNECE (1902) (naive, "open" ap-
proach of many religious proselytizers); PAUI's LIFE AND LE'rr RS (S. Sperry ed. 1955).
1, See text accompanying note 28 supra; Conway & Siegelman, supra note 17, at 86; Gil.
lis, Sun Myung Moon: "Heavenly Deception," TRm, PRAc. 22 (Aug. 1979).
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recruit, on learning of the misrepresentation, could simply leave.
With present-day cults, this option may not be available. After lur-
ing the convert-to-be to a "guest lecture," "work camp," or "Peace
Corps" meeting,63 some cult organizations apply classic techniques
of coercive persuasion to minimize the chances that the recruit will
defect once the group's identity is known.6 This combina-
tion-deception to gain a foothold and coercive persuasion to con-
solidate it-presents dangers that the legal system has only begun
to confront.
- Another reason to reject any negative historical inference relates
to the increased understanding of the mechanisms of psychological
manipulation and the recent knowledge that cults use these ma-
nipulative techniques.65 Before the recent studies of Lifton,"
Meerlo, 7 Schein," West,69 and others,70 little was known about co-
ercive persuasion of the sophisticated type employed by cult
organizations. 1 The legal system lacked the understanding neces-
sary to frame rules, or even to appreciate the need for innovation.
Early efforts to restrain cultic abuses thus relied on models of
physical domination-unlawful imprisonment, kidnapping, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, slavery, and peonage 7 2 But
3 See Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 38-40 (deception in the recruitment
process).
See notes 82-95 and accompanying text infra.
Id.; DSMMD HI, supra note 23.
". LrFTON, supra note 23, at 4-5 (1961); Lifton, supra note 1.
7 J. hmmo, RAPE OF THE IN (1956).
"E. SCHmN, supra note 1; Schein, supra note 1.
69 Farber, Harlow, & West, supra note 23.
70 See sources cited note 1 supra.
71 Certainly, psychiatric knowledge of a mental condition or phenomenon need not be
complete for it to be applied by courts; see generally Delgado, Ascription, supra note 1, at
24. For example, the modem test of insanity, dating back to the trial of Daniel M'Naughten,
was intended by the judges in that case merely to restate prior law existing since 1724. Yet,
as of 1880, a treatise of psychiatry offered a classification scheme in which insanity was said
to be caused by "moral influences," "intellectual overwork," and "masturbation." J.
BROWNE, THE lMaDmr JumRnuDENcCE OF INsirry 131 (1880). The legal system chose, nev-
ertheless, to exculpate defendants on the basis of markedly rudimentary medical knowledge
because paradigmatic cases of insanity were recognizable and moral intuitions called for
exculpation. Delgado, Ascription, supra note 1, at 24.
" E.g., United States v. Carr, No. CR-79-195-D (MLD.N.C. filed Oct. 31, 1979) (slavery
prosecution; three members of Church of God and True Holiness pleaded guilty to charges
of holding members in slavery); Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D U.
1978), afTd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979) (damages action for involuntary servitude dis-
missed); Schuppin v. Unification Church, 435 F. Supp. 603 (D. Vt. 1977) (civil suit for alien-
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these have proven effective only in extreme cases of exploitation."
More subtle means of mental and physical manipulation require
new approaches.
II. THE CULT-JOINING PROCESS
A. A Paradigm
Judicial and legislative records, as well as first-person accounts
of cult experiences, draw a composite picture of the process by
which a typical young person becomes a memb~r.74 Usually, the
youth is just above the age of majority and is physically and psy-
chologically normal. 5 The home life is ordinary; there is no appar-
ent pathology of any sort. 6 The youth is often a college student, or
at some other "in-between" period of his or her life-uncertain, at
loose ends, anxious (all normal experiences). 7
The approach is made by an experienced cult recruiter of the
opposite sex. Approaching the target individual at a college dormi-
tory, social function, library, or bus stop, the recruiter smiles,
makes eye contact, and strikes up a conversation on a disarming
topic suggested by the location, the recruit's clothing, books, or
equipment.7 8 The proselytizer is taught to concentrate on youths
ation from family and involuntary servitude dismissed); People v. Murphy (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
Mar. 18, 1977) (Justice Leahy) (criminal prosecution of Hare Krishna leaders for unlawful
imprisonment of followers by psychological means dismissed).
3 United States v. Carr, No. CR-79-195-D (M.D.N.C. filed Oct. 31, 1979) (guilty plea to
holding church members in state of slavery); Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at
93-97 and cases cited therein; Delgado, Religious Totalism as Slavery, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 51 (1979). These remedies are only available when cult leaders perpetrate torts
or crimes in the process of recruiting or indoctrinating members.
74 See generally JONESTOWN REPORT, supra note 8, at 17-19; DasTRucrIvE CONVERSION,
supra note 11, at 8-18 (similarities among cults and conversion practices); id. at 44-62 (theo-
retical model of cult joining); Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 38-41.
75 Vermont Hearings, supra note 8, at 13 (psychiatrist's description of "adaptive" group
of indoctrinees); DSTRUCTIV CULT CONVERSION, supra note 11, at 28; R. ENROTH, supra
note 21, at 154-56; Shapiro, Destructive Cultism, 15 Am. FAM. PHYsICMN 80, 81, 83 (Feb.
1977).
76 See note 75 supra.
7 Vermont Hearings, supra note 8, at 13; DEsTRucTVE CULT CoNVERSlON, supra note 11,
at 10; Shapiro, supra note 75, at 81, 93; FRONTIERS OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 23, at 1. A few
cults diverge from this pattern; Jones' Peoples Temple recruited mature persons and retir-
ees; the Children of God sect recruits blue-collar persons.
78 E.g., R. ENRom, supra note 21, at 102 ("We had the whole thing choreographed ....
The ... purpose was to put the hook in, to discover what would grab them emotionally.");
Shapiro, supra note 75, at 81; Smith, Inside a Moonie Camp: A Weekend at Boonville
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who are alone or who look preoccupied.7 9 The recruiter next elicits
a subject of concern to the target, such as war, race, poverty, the
impersonality of the university, or the moral ambiguities of mod-
em life."0
The recruiter professes interest and surprise: by coincidence, he
or she belongs to a group that has the same concern. The friends
share a house together near the campus. Just that evening, in fact,
they are holding a dinner and discussion. There will be a guest
speaker and a free meal. The recruit is urged to attend.1
At the meeting, the target person finds himself or herself sur-
rounded by other smiling young people of about the same age who
demonstrate great interest in his or her clothes, ideas, and exper-
iences. He or she is showered with flattery, smiles, handholding,
and feigned affection. Later, a rousing speech is given on a vague
but stimulating topic, and a simple meal is eaten.82 The group does
not identify itself.83 At the end of the initial meeting, the group
Training Center, S.F. Chronicle, Dec. 11, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (use of "love bombing" or cynical
flattery to win members--"I was told I looked intelligent, had a happy face, my sweater was
beautiful, my shoes were nice, and I was unique"); Galper, Indoctrination Methods of the
Unification Church (Mar. 13, 1977) (paper presented at annual meeting, Calif. State
Psychol. Ass'n) ("high level of affective arousal is generated and maintained"). See also
Unification Church, 120-Day International Training Center (Barrytown, N.Y.) Workshop
Manual at 338 (love bombing to consolidate membership) (undated, on file with author)
[hereinafter cited as Unification Church Workshop Manual].
79 Vermont Hearings, supra note 8, at 64-65; Drsmucnv CuLT CoNVEaszoN, supra note
11, at 10; R. ENRoTH, supra note 21, at 158 (recruiters develop "uncanny" knack for identi-
fying vulnerable youths); C. SToNER & A. PAmm, supra note 21, at 6, 21; FRoNmERS oF
PSYCHATRY, supra note 23, at 1; Dole-Buckley Meeting Report, supra note 21, pt. 2, at 35.
80 E.g., Tim, June 14, 1976, at 48-49; Dole-Buckley Meeting Report, supra note 21, pt. 2,
at 11, 12, 16, 17, 21, 24, 37, 40.
81 E.g., DasmucvwE CULT CQNVMRSION, supra note 11, at 10-11; C. SToNER & A. PAsua,
supra note 21, at 6-8; Rasmussen, The Moon Treatment, HARPER's WwcLY, Dec. 1, 1975, at
3, coL 2; Galper, supra note 78, at 2-7.
" New York Hearings, supra note 8, pt. II, at 63-65; Drsmucnv CuLT COVmES0N,
supra note 11, at 11; Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 40, 55 & n.301.
-' New York Hearings, supra note 8, at 22-23; id. pt. II, at 110-12, 165-67; Vermont Hear-
ings, supra note 8, at 78; R. ENROTH, supra note 21, at 42-43, 100-01, 158; Rice, The Pull of
Sun Moon, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1976 (Magazine), at 23; Galper, supra note 78, at 4 ("target
individual ... generally has no awareness that he is participating in training activities of an
aggressive proselytizing religious organization until the conclusion of the weekend rural
camp experience .... There are no signs in the exterior building facade or on the interior
walls that identify the center."). Some cult groups may use concealment sporadically, at
certain times and for certain purposes. Compare Conway & Siegelman, supra note 17, at 86
(Hare Krishna conversion ceremonies unmistakably religious) with text accompanying notes
178-87 infra (Hare Krishna found by court to use disguises and false identifiction in fund-
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pressures the new person to attend a longer (often three-day)
workshop in the group's country retreat." The workshop is
presented as an opportunity for the recruit and his or her new-
found friends to "get to know each other better" and for him or
her to learn more about the group.
At the retreat, held in an isolated setting, the recruit encounters
additional warmth and friendship, but also a barrage of speakers,
classes, songs, chanting, games, and "struggle sessions." 85 There is
little time for rest, privacy, and reflection; a more experienced cult
member accompanies the recruit at all times. Diet and hours of
sleep are severely restricted, while a constant sensory barrage and
nonstop activity maintain the recruit in a state of narrowed
attention."6
Topics such as the spiritual world, guilt, salvation, and the iden-
tity of the organization and its leader are introduced in carefully
staged sequences, as the cult perceives that the recruit is "ready"
for them, and in physical circumstances designed to make with-
drawal difficult and unlikely.8 7 If the recruit expresses doubts, or
shows curiosity about the group or its objectives, he or she is told
to suspend them, as these matters will be addressed later.8 When
the person finally does gain this information, he or she is unable to
act because of impaired judgment resulting from sleep deprivation,
raising at state fair).
" E.g., Vermont Senate Judiciary Committee, Transcript, Mar. 10, 1976, at 22-23 [herein-
after cited as Vermont Senate Judiciary Committee]; JONESTOWN REPORT, supra note 8, at
17; Galper, supra note 78, at 2, 4-7.
85 JONESTOWN REPORT, supra note 8, at 17-18.
68 New York Hearings, supra note 8, at 22-23, 27-28; id. pt. III at 12-18; Vermont Senate
Judiciary Committee, supra note 84, at 19; JONES'OWN REPORT, supra note 8, at 17; R. EN-
ROTH, supra note 21, at 159; Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 55-56; Dole-
Buckley Meeting Report, supra note 21, pt. 2, at 12, 14; see HzASwr TRIAL, supra note 1, at
256-57 (sensory overload, including continuous tapes, chantings, frenetic activity, singing,
drills). See also R. ENROTH, supra note 21, at 14, 39-40, 59; J. MINDSZENTY, supra note 24, at
105, 110, 112-14 (1974); C. STONER & A. PARKS, supra note 21, at 159; Galper, supra note 78,
at 6 (absence of opportunity for privacy, reflection); Unification Church Workshop Manual,
supra note 78, at 63, 74, 75 (fasting, hunger, weakness); cf. Shapiro, supra note 75, at 83;
Galper, supra note 78, at 1 (trance-like states, exhaustion, borderline consciousness).
17 New York Hearings, supra note 8, at 159-64; DESTRUCrlVE CULT CONVERSION, supra
note 11, at 12; Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 12-14, 65-56, and sources cited
therein.
" Vermont Hearings, supra note 8, at 17; JONESTOWN REPORT, supra note 8, at 17; Ras-
mussen, supra note 81, at 3, col. 1, at 18, col. 1. See generally R. LirroN, supra note 22, at
66-83 (prisoners taught to feel guilty, repress doubts).
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peer pressure, guilt, and excitement.8 9 The final act of commitment
is made when the young person, isolated from friends and family,
and surrounded by cohorts who press him or her to make a com-
mitment, is anxious about sin, identity, and salvation, and frantic
for a framework within which to solve these frightening
problems 0
If the target person commits himself or herself to the group, ad-
ditional indoctrination takes place. Physiological depletion, anxi-
ety, isolation, and repetitious lecturing and chanting serve further
to distance the individual from earlier behavior and thought;
meanwhile, cult leaders press him or her to reorganize life into
simplistic patterns of right and wrong, good and evil, us and
them.91 The person's past recedes in his or her memory, replaced
with a new, intense preoccupation with the group and its part in
cosmic struggles.92
The convert's estrangement from the past is accelerated by
shifts in language and thought patterns. Words acquire new mean-
ings. Critical thinking is discouraged, along with humor and meta-
phor. Converts are taught to feel, not to think; to obey, not to rea-
son.93 When the process has continued for a number of weeks or
months, the recruit may be deemed ready for the duties of a full-
time member: fundraising on the streets, work in a cult-operated
business, or scavenging for edible garbage." The new member ap-
" New York Hearings, supra note 8, at 159-64; JoNErowN REPORT, supra note 8, at 17-
18; DESTRUcrIE CULT CONVERSION, supra note 11, at 13-14; Delgado, Religious Totalism,
supra note 1, at 40-41, and sources cited therein.
90 DasmRucrv CULT CoNVRSION, supra note 11, at 13; Delgado, Religious Totalism,
supra note 1, at 40-41.
11 New York Hearings, supra, note 8, at 243-45; id. pt. m at 39-42; Jo~nSrOWN REPORT,
supra note 8, at 17-18; R. ENROTH, supra note 21, at 162; C. SToNER & A. PARK, supra note
21, at 175. See also HEARST TAI, supra note 1, at 257, 317 (inculcation of black-white, we-
they world view); R. LIrON, supra note 23 (same). See also E. SCrmN, supra note 1, at 131-
33, 139 (dissociation from past).
"Compare sources cited in note 91 supra, with HEAS TRIAL, supra note 1, at 257-58,
288, 298, 300 (identity change under pressure).
"New York Hearings, supra note 8, pt. II, at 243-45; JoNESrowN REPORT, supra note 8,
at 18; DEsTRUcrIVE CULT CoNVERSIoN, supra note 11, at 14-16; R. ENRoTR, supra note 21, at
15; Conway & Siegelman, supra note 17, at 86 ("techniques... rely on the use... of...
deceptive and distorted language, artfully designed suggestion and intense emotional experi-
ence, crippling tactics aggravated by physical exhaustion and isolation"); Dole-Buckley
Meeting Report, supra note 21, pt. 1, at 32.
1 New York Hearings, supra note 8, at 28; id. pt. H, at 122-23; C. STONER & A. PARKE,
supra note 21, at 5-31, 121-33; Dole-Buckley Meeting Report, supra note 21, pt. H, at 11, 14,
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pears simplistic in his or her thinking patterns, stereotyped in his
or her responses, unresponsive to relatives and former friends, and
indifferent to events in the outside world. 5 He or she has become a
cultist.
B. The Paradigm Analyzed: Consent-Negating Features in Cul-
tic Induction
The above account contains several features that call into ques-
tion the adequacy of the convert's consent.
1. Traditional Consent-Negating Elements. Cult conversion
practices often include such traditional consent-negating features
as deception, coercion, physical or mental debility,96 and abuse of a
fiduciary relationship.9 7 In determining consent in extra-risky set-
tings, modern courts have looked to additional factors: the irre-
versibility of the process or change, its intrusiveness or far-reach-
ing quality, and the unpredictability of effect.9 8 As these are often
24, 36, 62; id. pt. I, at 24.
5 E.g., New York Hearings, supra note 8, at 25-29; DSTRUCrIVE CULT CONVERSIoN, supra
note 11, at 16-17; R. ENROTH, supra note 21, at 121 (cognitive process "scrambled"); Dole-
Buckley Meeting Report, supra note 21, pt. II, at 14, 18 (robot-like responses, "glassy-eyed
stare," behavior like that of a "retarded person"); Galper supra note 78 (cognitive inflexibil-
ity, blunted affect, shallow "programmed-in" responses).
Coercion. See California Senate Select Committee on Children and Youth: Hearing on
the Impact of Cults on Today's Youth 26-27 ("your head will be severed from your shoul-
ders" if you leave), 67, 96 (threats of violence if member leaves) (hereinafter cited as
Dymally Hearings]; New York Hearings, supra note 8, pt. II at 163 (physical threats); Ver-
mont Hearings, supra note 8, at 59-60 (leaving would doom herself, her siblings, and par-
ents to "fifteen generations.., of hell"); R. ENROTH, supra note 21, at 59 (member would
become insane, turn into a homosexual, or be "turned over to a reprobate mind" if he loft
sect); Conway & Siegelman, supra note 17, at 88 ("physical punishment, reported by ap-
proximately one in five respondents, included beatings, starvation, physical bondage
and long hours of humiliating and degrading labor. 'I was beaten, harassed and locked in a
room,' said one woman who had tried to leave a cult and had succeeded only on a second
attempt"); Rofes, I was Brainwashed by the Followers of Rev. Sun Myung Moon (But I
Wised Up), Harvard Crimson, Sept. 30, 1975, at 4, col. 1 (cult brother would break both the
member's legs if necessary to prevent his defection from the group). Deception. See, e.g.,
Vermont Hearings, supra note 8, at 78; R. ENROTH, supra note 21, at 158; C. STONER & A.
PARKS, supra note 21, at 167; Gillis, supra note 62; Dole-Buckley Meeting Report, supra
note 21, pt. II at 11, 12, 16, 21, 24, 37, 40 (false ads, front groups, misrepresentation of
organization). Exploitation of physical or mental debility. Vermont Hearings, supra note 8,
at 63; R. ENROTH, supra note 21, at 49, 64; Dole-Buckley Meeting Report, supra note 21, pt.
I at 24, 27, pt. I at 25; Galper, supra note 78, at 1. See generally notes 89-90 and accompa-
nying text supra.
I See notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra, and sources cited therein.
"8 See generally Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Mich.
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present in the cult-joining situation,"9 the case for an informed
consent requirement strengthens.
2. Unique Elements in Cult Conversion. There are other ele-
ments peculiar to the cult-joining process that have not yet been
discussed by courts. One is the cults' maintenance of an inverse
relationship between capacity and knowledge, the two key ingredi-
ents of informed consent.100 At early stages, the recruit's decisional
capacity is relatively intact. He or she may be anxious about some
adolescent crisis, lonely, or confused, but is generally not clinically
incompetent or pathological.101 However, knowledge of the cult's
identity and of the obligations of membership is missing. If this
information were disclosed at the time of initial contact, many re-3
cruits would react by leaving.102 The cult therefore keeps these ele-
ments secret until the recruit can be expected not to react nega-
tively.103 Information is parceled out only as the cult perceives that
the person has lost the capacity to respond according to his or her
ordinary frame of reference.110 Knowledge and capacity are thus
maintained in inverse proportion.
A second, related feature unique to cult-joining is segmentation
of induction into steps or stages, with only nominal consent given
by the recruit before progressing from each stage to the next. 05
Cir. Ct. Wayne County, July 10, 1973), reprinted in 2 PRISON L REP. 433, 473 (1973); Sha-
piro, supra note 1, at 262-69.
" See notes 21-25, 91-95 and accompanying text supra (far-reaching changes) and notes
28, 78-83 supra (subject's unawareness of these future changes). See also Vermont Hear-
ings, supra note 8, at 67-68 (low probability of return); R. Emwm, supra note 21, at 95-96,
120, 200 (difficulty or impossibility of cultist's leaving on his or her own); N.Y. Times, Mar.
5, 1973, at 1, col. 3, at 19, coL 5 (intervention necessary because power of cults over followers
is overwhelming); Rofes, supra note 96, at 3, col. 1 (of 70 attenders, Harvard journalist was
only one to leave at end of Mooh training camp); Dole-Bucldey Meeting Report, supra note
21, pt. II, at 21, 61 (members unable to leave of own will).
1-o See generally Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 54-55.
101 See notes 75-77 and accompanying text supra.
1- E.g., C. SToNER & A. PARuc, supra note 21, at 167-72; Delgado, Religious Totalism,
supra note 1, at 54.
'-0 See notes 87-90 and accompanying text supra; R. ENROTH, supra note 21, at 42-43;
100-01; Smith, supra note 78, at 11, col 1 (unpalatable information imparted in staged se-
quence); Galper, supra note 78, at 1-5.
204 See note 103 supra.
,0- See Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 55-56 (giving example of physician
who obtains patient's consent to a series of treatments, the cumulative effect of which is
concealed from that patient; and citing cases that suggest that the nondisciosing physician is
guilty of malpractice).
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Thus, at the time of initial contact with the recruiter, the recruit
consents to go to the evening gathering. At the first meeting, he or
she consents to attend a longer retreat. Toward the end of the re-
treat, he or she agrees to sign up for an even longer workshop. At
each stage, the intensity of the indoctrination and the convert's
dependence on the group increase."" The ultimate effect is a com-
mitment to a journey, each step of which is nominally consented
to, but whose ultimate destination is concealed until the penulti-
mate step-at which point the individual has been so prepared
that committing his or her life and fortune to the group seems a
small and insignificant step.107 Both features-the maintenance of
an inverse relationship between knowledge and capacity, and the
segmentation of the joining process-deprive the convert of the
chance to exercise a fully autonomous decision to join or not to
join.
106 See, e.g., Vermont Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 84, at 22-23; C. STONER &
A. PARKE, supra note 21, at 6-8; Galper, supra note 78, at 2 ("potential recruit is invited to
attend a dinner .... At the conclusion of the... dinner he is invited to participate in a
weekend experience in an isolated rural setting .... At the conclusion of the weekend
experience recruits are invited to stay on at the camp for a week-long training session"), 4-7
(information parceled out as initiation proceeds).
107 New York Hearings, supra note 8, at 73-83; Rice, supra note 83, at 23 (recruit reaches
critical moment "worn out from lack of sleep, numbed by endless lectures, cut off from
family or friends, and softened up by the embracing warmth of the group"); id. at 23-24
("You just begin to feel high. After seven days of fatiguing your body and manipulating your
mind, they hook you, and you stay on.").
See also note 105 supra, comparing cult induction process to course of medical treatment,
each step of which is approved by the patient but the ultimate effect of which is concealed
by the doctor. Moral intuitions, and a small body of case law, suggest that the nondisclosing
physician commits malpractice.
Can the cult induction process be compared to the experience, familiar to everyone, of
falling in love? In romance, the two individuals begin as strangers who through a series of
steps become more intimately associated. As the relationship progresses, barriers are low-
ered, critical judgment suspended. Unpleasant facts about the love object are overlooked or
minimized. There is, though, a significant difference between romance and cult induction. In
love, both parties ordinarily know where things lead. Where one does not, we call the acts of
the other "seduction," and sometimes make them illegal, e.g., R. PERKINS, CuMmNAL LAW
158-66 (2d ed. 1969); W. PaOSSER, HANDBOOK OF Tm LAw OF ToRTs 884 (4th ed. 1971).
Similarly, we condemn the romancer who fails to disclose significant facts about himself or
herself (that he or she is already married, impotent, a felon, has a venereal disease, etc.), at
the beginning of the relationship. Cult induction, then, predicated as it often is on decep-
tion, cannot be compared to ordinary romance.
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C. Policy Analysis
As has been seen, cultist conversion activity poses dangers to the
physical health and emotional well-being of some persons without
full consent. 08 We have also seen that the informed consent re-
quirement is a plausible way of addressing these problems and is
consistent with the liberty values of the religion clauses. In consid-
ering whether to institute such a requirement, we reasonably might
wish to know further: (1) how well the policy values of informed
consent would be served by enforcing such a requirement in reli-
gious conversion, and (2) how well the requirement would function
in relation to the nonliberty values of the religion clauses.
Informed consent requirements serve a number of purposes: pro-
tecting the individual's interest in psychic or bodily integrity; pre-
serving a sense of shared venture between the consent-giver and
the consent-obtainer; and promoting visibility and scrutiny of the
treatment in question.' 0 ' Requiring informed consent in religious
proselytizing would promote each of these values. Insisting that
the future cultist be offered information about the cult advances
the goal of personal control over major decisions; it promotes closer
identification between proselytizers and their targets, and encour-
ages shared decisionmaking power. By requiring disclosure, and
allowing tort suits where disclosure is not made, public awareness
of cult conversion and its consequences should increase.'10
In addition to the generalized disclosure/free-choice values dis-
cussed earlier,"'* many of the underlying values of the religion
clauses would be further advanced by an informed consent require-
108 This is not to suggest that the model fits all cases of cult joining, only that it describes
many such cases. Some youths may join a cult fully aware of its identity and the conditions
of membership. Others may arrive at this knowledge by induction, early in the proceedings.
In neither such case does an informed consent problem arise. The same is, of course, true of
medical treatment - some patients may not be fully informed by their physicians, yet ac-
cept treatment knowledgeably and voluntarily, having gotten the pertinent information else-
where. Others may waive informed consent. Neither of these specific factors counts against a
general requirement of informed consent to medical procedures; neither should the occur-
rence of voluntary or informed cult-joining count against the requirement urged here.
109 J. KATZ, supra note 14, at 540-608.
110 An informed pre-inductee might, for example, seek advice from others or learn about
the cult by reading. If informed consent is not obtained, he or she may bring suit. See notes
130-31 and accompanying text infra. Both consequences will increase public scrutiny and
awareness of cultic recruiting and indoctrination practices.
" See notes 34-60 and accompanying text supra.
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ment. These values include strife avoidance,11 neutrality, 13 reli-
gious pluralism,11 4 avoidance of "ignorance and corruption,"115 and
protection of liberty of conscience. 116
An effective informed consent requirement should lessen societal
strife in several ways. At present, the only forms of redress availa-
ble to a disenchanted leaver are to become a deprogrammer,117
11 E.g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). L. TamE, supra note 41, § 14-12, at 868.
11 E.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 41, § 14-4, at 821-23, and cases cited therein.
114 E.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952); L. PFEFFER, CREEDS IN COMPETITION
(1958); L. TRIBE, supra note 41, at 816, 834; 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183-91 (G.
Hunt ed. 1901).
11 M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 6 (1965); P. MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS:
His CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 89, 98 (1953); 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 487 (G. Hunt ed. 1910); Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doc-
trinal Development: Part II, The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REV. 513, 517
(1968).
116 E.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 41, § 14-12, at 886; Freeman, A Remonstrance for Con-
science, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 806 (1958).
,,? Deprogrammers provide nonstop confrontational therapy, often in locked motel rooms,
aimed at restoring independence of thought and breaking the hold of the cult. See, e.g., T.
PARTICK, LET OUR CHILDREN Go (1976); Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 78-88.
Ted Patrick (nicknamed "Black Lightning" by cultists), the developer of deprogramming
methods, claims to have successfully deprogrammed over 1000 individuals over the past
decade.
Many deprogrammers are themselves ex-cult members. A deprogramming typically begins
by the deprogrammer's challenging the adherent's trust in the religious leaders in an at-
tempt to show the subject that he or she has been duped or deceived. Delgado, Religious
Totalism, supra note 1, at 78. The deprogrammer may demonstrate that the leader has a
long criminal record, or lives a life of opulence, in violation of the sect's rules. Id.; see also
Conway & Siegelman, supra note 17, at 92. He or she may point out inconsistencies in the
cult's teaching, or between its teachings and its practices. He or she may attempt to demon-
strate to the cultist that particular teachings are factually false-for example, that the cult-
ist's parents hate him or her and wish him or her spiritual harm. Deprogrammers often
adopt a scathing, forceful, or sarcastic tone, but physical force and brutality appear to be
rare. Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 79.
The cultist often responds angrily, or passively, or by pretending not to hear. E.g., Peter-
son v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981), dis-
cussed at notes 147-59 and accompanying text infra. Others try to block the deprogram-
mer's message by chanting, singing, or performing rhythmic movements designed to
maintain a trance state. Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 79, and sources cited
therein. The deprogrammer often succeeds eventually in engaging the subject in a dialoguo,
sometimes in an angry one. Once the individual "opens up," the deprogramming proceeds
rapidly, as layers of shallow responses and programmed-in values are peeled away. Finally,
there comes a "breaking point"--an emotional moment when the subject laughs, cries, em-
braces those present, and expresses gratitude for being retrieved. Id. at 79-80. See Conway
& Siegelman, supra note 17, at 90. There often follows a period of emotional instability,
depression, and mood changes, during which the ex-cultist adjusts to life outside the sect.
19821 CULTS AND CONVERSION
campaign actively against cults, or try to persuade a government
agency to "investigate" them.118 A private action in tort, based on
the informed consent doctrine, would provide the recruit with a
direct, legal remedy. In addition, the only recourse presently open
to parents of recruits is abduction and deprogramming °10 If the
radical changes brought about in their children were seen as freely
chosen, many parents would be less alarmed, and retaliation and
self-help should diminish.
At the same time, the goal of official neutrality with respect to
religious affairs would be advanced, as a value-neutral1 20 criterion
of consent would replace existing criteria more prone to subjectiv-
ity and bias.12 1 Informed consent would also promote religious plu-
ralism, by which a sect must "flourish [according to] . . . the ap-
peal of its dogma. 1 22 By denying aggressive religious factions
access to recruiting techniques that bypass the decison-making fac-
ulties of would-be adherents, the requirement protects the "free
market" values of the religion clauses.1 23 Furthermore, it helps pre-
Although there are few credible statistics available, a majority of deprogrammings seem to
be successfuL The duration of the actual event varies from a few hours to a few days. Con-
way & Siegelman, supra note 17, at 92.
118 The author is aware of at least 10 federal and state agencies and legislative committees
that have received petitions or been the objects of letter-writing campaigns by constituents.
Generally, these demand that the authorities "investigate" the groups in question and find
ways to curb their "brainwashing" practices.
118 Abduction and deprogramming, as well as the "defense of necessity" entered when
retrieval fails and prosecution results, are described in Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra
note 1, at 78-88.
120 An objection that finding a given commitment to a cult group nonconsensual inevita-
bly disparages the group's values and teachings is answered in notes 220-23 and accompany-
ing text infra.
121 The defense of necessity, for example, invites the factfinder to decide whether the
deprogrammer's and parents' attempted abduction was necessary to avert a greater evil
than that which would result from their intervention. The comparison of the two evils in-
vites decisions based on evidence of the bizarre quality of the religion or the lifestyle of the
group. Conservatorship statutes often permit the assertion of authority over a person who is
found likely to be deceived or preyed upon by designing persons, or who is unable to man-
age his or her affairs. See Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 88-91. These vague
criteria can easily be manipulated. The proposed informed-consent requirement, by con-
trast, focuses the court's attention on a single, objective event- the proselytizer's disclosure,
or lack thereof, of certain information. This more neutral criterion seems less likely to be
manipulated for or against the religious group by a factfinder unsympathetic (or sympa-
thetic) to it.
"2 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
123 Pluralism in religious matters is endangered if religious groups are able to entrap
members without their conscious choice.
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vent exploitation and corruption in religious recruitment," 4 and
protects integrity of conscience.125 The requirement would thus
promote the concerns that underlie disclosure/consent require-
ments, as well as those that animate the religion clauses.
III. FRAMING AND EFFECTUATING THE INFORMED CONSENT
REQUIREMENT
We have seen that a requirement of informed consent is needed;
we now turn to the specific form such a requirement would take.
Because the constitutional interests of proselytizers are at stake 120
the requirement should be no more onerous than that which is nec-
essary to protect the recruit's interests in free choice. 127 It would
seem that both interests can best be accommodated by a require-
ment of interactive consent,128 mediated by the recruit so as to give
him or her control over the scope of disclosure. The recruiter's ini-
tial duty would be to offer material information at the point when
conversion activity begins.1 2' Not every individual will wish to hear
it; some will wish to delay the receipt of information; some will
want more information, others less. If the subject expresses an in-
terest in learning detailed information about the group's practices,
the converter would be under a duty to disclose it. If the convert
indicates a desire not to receive information, however, the prosely-
tizer's duty is discharged and conversion activity can proceed.
What would constitute the required initial disclosure? The con-
verter should, at a minimum, be required to reveal that the group
is religious, to give its most widely known name or identity, and to
.24 It avoids ignorance by requiring that the proselytizer offer information to the subject;
it avoids corruption by depriving the cult or proselytizer of an incentive to practice conceal-
ment or misrepresentation, as some now do. See notes 28, 64-71 and accompanying text
supra.
" It does so by assuring that persons do not affiliate with groups or adopt values that
they would not if permitted to make a considered decision.
12 The proselytizer desires to recruit new members in order to make his or her religious
group larger and more powerful, or to bring enlightenment to nonbelievers. If motivated by
a sincere religious conviction, this desire is entitled to prima facie constitutional protection.
See notes 167-70 and accompanying text infra.
'27 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (least restrictive alternative requirement
in religious liberty cases); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306.07 (1940).
128 See generally Comment, When the Truth Can Hurt: Patient-Mediated Informed
Consent in Cancer Therapy, 9 U.C.L.A.-ALAsxA L. REv. 143 (1980) (proposing a similar
requirement).
" See note 166 infra (when conversion begins).
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offer to provide further information. From this point on, the con-
vert controls the scope of inquiry, with the converter's only duty
being to respond honestly and fully to all questions, or to discon-
tinue the conversion attempt.
If a cult breaches the duty to obtain informed consent, and the
individual succeeds in disengaging from the organization, he or she
can sue in tort.130 General damages would be recoverable for the
affront of involuntarily imposed religiosity; special damages would
be available for any lost wages, medical expenses, loss of consor-
tium, and emotional distress. If the failure to inform is willful, pu-
nitive damages should be available as well. If the principal rem-
edy-private actions in tort-proves inadequate, legislatures could
enact further protection: a "cooling off" period, a requirement that
religious proselytizers wear identification badges, or provisions for
the filing of documents requesting rescue.13 1 In addition, educa-
tional authorities could launch campaigns designed to acquaint
school-age youth with the recruitment patterns of cult groups and
make them aware of their legal rights."3 '
After an individual proceeds nonconsensually to membership,
the analysis becomes more problematical. Private suits can be
brought only after the recruiter breaches the requirement and the
harm materializes. If, however, the breach and the subsequent in-
culcation of cultic values are successful, there will be no plaintiff to
bring suit: the victim's preference rationales will be altered so that
he or she identifies with cult values and perceives the earlier non-
consensual induction as harmless and perhaps even necessary to
free him or her from the shackles of the material world.lan
130 The tort could be called "fraud," "misrepresentation" (see IV. PRossmR, supra note
107, at 683-736), or "unprivileged induction."
"' For a discussion of these remedies, see Delgado Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at
73, 74, & 77-78.
E.g., Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 74-75 (proposing similar remedy).
a Thus, the dilemma arises: "the very factors of stress, coercion, and psychic bombard-
ment that cast doubt on the validity of consent can also give rise to a new, if temporary,
identity on the parts of the individuals whose consent is under examination." Delgado, Reli-
gious Totalism, supra note 1, at 57; see also Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 128
(Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981) (The "cult conditioning process induces
dramatic and non-consensual change giving rise to a new temporary identity on the part of
the individuals whose consent is under examination." Impaired volitional capacity was a
result. "As such, the question of. . . consent becomes a function of time.")
The literature on coercive persuasion contains numerous references to wide-ranging value
and identity changes resulting from the combined pressures of totalistic environments. See
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In many cases, the conversion will be temporary, and will "wash
away" if the individual is deprogrammed or simply removed from
the cult setting for a brief period. 8 When this happens, the per-
son's desires vary as a function of time and relief from reinforce-
ment. At time A, the individual professes to be happy as a cult
member and demands to be left alone. At time B-perhaps only a
few hours later- he or she expresses relief and gratitude over be-
ing freed.13 5 To make matters even more difficult, both choices will
seem "rational" in that the individual can justify them by refer-
ence to broader values he or she holds or claims to hold.138 The
generally R. ENROTH, supra note 21, at 12, 38 ("like a fog ... like a dream"), 83-84, 161-63
(new person, new values); Dole-Buckley Meeting Report, supra note 21, pt. II, at 16 ("radi-
cal change"), 30 ("totally changed person"), 39 ("personality transformation"), 40 ("marked
change"), 43 ("complete reversal"), 68 ("radical change . . . totally different person-
dehumanized"). See also HiAsr TRiAL, supra note 1, at 298; R. LIF'roN, supra note 23, at 5,
11, 66, 83 (rebirth, molding of new identity) (testimony of Dr. Martin Orne, psychiatrist)
(one forgets who one is; dissociation sets in), 317-35 (testimony of Dr. Robert Lifton, psychi-
atrist) (assault on personal identity); Lifton, Psychiatric Aspects of Chinese Communist
Thought Reform, in Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Symposium No. 4, Methods
of Forceful Indoctrination: Observations & Interviews 238, 247-48 (1957) (shifts in belief
and self so great as to warrant conclusion that change of identify has occurred). See gener-
ally Comment, The Limits of State Intervention: Personal Identity and Ultra-Risky Ac-
tions, 85 YALE L.J. 826, 837 & n.51 (1976) (citing studies indicating that trauma and disaster
victims disidentify with their earlier selves).
14 Compare Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 58-59, and sources cited
therein (temporary quality of programmed-in religious responses in cult settings), with R.
LnFroN, supra note 23, at 86-151; HEARST TRIAL, supra note 1, at 258-72 (testimony of Louis
J. West); id. at 318-21 (testimony of Robert J. Lifton) (fading of inculcated values once
individual is freed from the coercive/reinforcing environment).
"0 New York Hearings, supra note 8, pt. II at 184-85; R. ENROTH, supra note 21, at 121
("It's wonderful to be able to wake up in the morning and say, 'Thank God, I can do what I
want today.' "); T. PATRCK, supra note 117, at 79 (1976) (like waking up from a nightmare);
TIME, June 14, 1976, at 50 ("I felt as though a light had been turned on in the room and a
burden lifted from my shoulders. I really was free."); Chicago Tribune, Aug. 11, 1976, § 3
(Tempo), at col. 2, at 3, col. 4 ("like coming out of prison .... My life had been totally
taken away. I was a robot. What a fantastic joy it was to be a person againt").
16 The cultist, while with the group, might reason as follows:
(1) I value spiritual development;
(2) Membership in is necessary for my spiritual development;
(3) The loss of personal liberty, health, etc., resulting from membership is trivial by
comparison to the spiritual gain;
(4) I find it irrelevant that the group acted deceptively or wrongfully in procuring my
membership.
The ex-cultist, once freed from the group, might reason as follows:
(1) The group manipulated and tricked me into joining;
(2) While with the group I was in a state of thought reform and had no free will;
(3) My earlier statement of preference was itself programmed in;
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choices are thus neither insane nor incompetent, just variable.
How should courts treat these situations of rapidly fluctuating
preference? One possibility would be to treat time-variable consent
as evidence of selective incompetence, as some courts have done in
amputation cases, and appoint a proxy decisionmaker.'37 Another
would be to adopt a "first in time" or "last in time" approach, in
which the original or most recent values of the person in question
are respected.s A third approach would disregard justice consid-
erations and make the decision on utilitarian grounds.239 A fourth
approach would decide on grounds of intrapsychic freedom, or
long-term autonomy- when in doubt, opt for the treatment that
most respects the individual's potential for autonomous exercise of
his or her faculties.1 40 A fifth approach would assume that a person
can have only one "real" preference over a very short time-span,
and endeavor to provide criteria for determining what that prefer-
ence is.141 A final approach would attempt, by counseling or care-
(4) I am glad I am now free to make my own choices. I prefer autonomy values over
religious values, particularly if these latter are not freely chosen by me.
237 See, e.g., Department of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197, 209-10 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1978) ("In the present case, this Court has found the patient to be lucid and appar-
ently of sound mind generally. However, on the subjects of death and amputation of her
feet, her comprehension is blocked, blinded or dimmed to the extent that she is incapable of
recognizing facts which would be obvious to a person of normal perception.").
13 On behalf of the cult-period assertions, it could be argued that these should
predominate since they are religiously-based, are expressed by a competent adult, and our
society ought to prefer these to any others, particularly if it appears that these others might
be influenced by deprogramming, or some other form of "counterbrainwashing." On behalf
of the post-release expressions, it could be argued that these correspond most closely with
the values the individual held over the majority of his or her life, and that subsequent pro-
fession of those values constitutes an express repudiation of those uttered while within the
cult. Cf. Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 77-78 ("battle of the forms").
'13 Cf. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 237, 283 (discussing moral basis for compelling organic
treatment, a "sort of forced 'investment' in autonomy"). Shapiro writes: "From the perspec-
tive of classical utilitarian ethics ... in the collision between freedom from state coercion
and freedom from madness the latter should prevail, for the result is greater functionality."
Shapiro, however, questions this result as possibly unjust. Id. at 284.
140 Cf. id. at 283-88.
141 The most likely criteria would seem to be continuity with long-held beliefs (allowing,
of course, for gradual evolution and maturation), and authenticity, the notion that the value
or preference "represents" the individual holding the value or preference. It must be em-
phasized that these criteria would be applied only in the troublesome situations of rapidly
oscillating consent and when there is an indication that "abnormal" influences were in oper-
ation. These influences would include extreme physiological deprivation, deception, guilt
manipulation, total control by others of the individual's environment and channels of com-
munication, etc. See note 96 and accompanying text supra. The criteria could not be used to
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fully controlled deprogramming, 142 to move the wavering individ-
ual to a neutral third ground, from which he or she would be able
to evaluate the two choice systems and decide freely between
them.
1 43
The difficulty with all postinduction remedies is that, unlike
preinduction remedies and especially informed consent, they oper-
ate in the realm of religious belief.14 4 Preinduction remedies only
affect conduct, as they regulate the recruiter-recruit relationship at
a time before belief is formed and conversion fixed. As is discussed
more fully later,1 45 religiously motivated conduct is regulable on a
neutralize changes wrought by insight, education, reflection, miracles, reading, or ordinary
persuasion. See generally Delgado, Ascription, supra note 1, at 25-28 (responding to the
drawing-the-line problem); Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 63-73 (same).
142 See Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 85-88, suggesting limitations on
deprogramming: (1) that it be carried out only pursuant to a judicial order and finding that
the individual is incompetent or under mind control; (2) that deprogranming not proceed
unless milder measures have first been attempted; (3) that therapies not be aimed at de-
stroying religious faith or belief; (4) that therapy not be aimed at reuniting the individual
with his family or at convincing him to accept an alternative lifestyle (e.g., return to col-
lege); (5) that therapy end as soon as the individual is restored to capacity and is able to
make choices; (6) that the post-treatment individual be free to return to the group; (7) that
deprogramming be carried out only under the supervision of a licensed psychologist or psy-
chiatrist and under judicial supervision.
143 Cf. Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CmI. L. REv.
755, 778-79 (1969) (discussing suggestion that incompetents be treated involuntarily only to
the point at which they are able to understand their condition and accept or reject further
treatment).
144 Guardianship, conservatorship, and civil commitment proceedings have been em-
ployed to remove and treat cultists. See generally Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note
1, at 88-91. Proposed legislation in two states would provide a remedy expressly tailored to
cult-like conditioning. Senate Bill 524, to be considered by the Oregon Legislative Assembly
during its 1981 Regular Session, provides for a temporary guardian of any person incapaci-
tated by reason of undue influence of a person or group. Undue influence can be shown by
evidence of: deception; deprivation of privacy, rest, medical care, and opportunity to com-
municate with others; and impairment of mental and physical independence. It can be man-
ifested by:. impairment of individual thought or action; loss of spontaneity or originality in
behavior and speech; regression to child-like levels of behavior; extreme dependence; and
sudden changes in personality.
In 1980, both houses of the New York state legislature enacted a similar bill, but the
governor of the state vetoed it. The bill has been redrafted and will be introduced during
the next session. It would amend the state mental hygiene law by adding a new article
providing for temporary guardians for persons who have undergone nonconsensual changes
manifested by: drastic physical and psychological deterioraton; abrupt abandonment of val-
ues and goals; blunted emotional responses; regression; physical change3; reduction of deci-
sional capacity; and psychopathological changes, which may include dissociation, obsessional
thinking, and loss of cognitive flexibility. (Draft bills on file with author).
'" See notes 167-73 and accompanying text infra.
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showing of compelling state interest. Religious belief, on the other
hand, is highly, perhaps absolutely, protected. Should protection of
religious belief extend to belief that is inculcated through disap-
proved means and without a conscious, informed choice on the
part of the believer? An argument can be made that appellate de-
cisions protecting free choice in religious matters1 48 imply that un-
chosen belief is not protectable, or at least not protected abso-
lutely. The issue seems never to have been litigated and should be
regarded as an open question.
The only decision by a higher level court dealing with religious
manifestations of questionable origin and authenticity is Peterson
v. Sorlien,147 a December 1980 decision of the Minnesota Supreme
Court. In Sorlien, the parents of a young cultist tricked her into
leaving the cult to visit the home of a family friend.148 There, she
was confined and confronted with a team of deprogrammers who
attempted to engage her in "reality-inducing therapy." For three
days, the young woman strenuously objected, adopting the fetal
position and blocking her ears with her fingers to avoid hearing
what the deprogramming team and her parents were saying.14'
Later, she talked with the deprogrammers, reconsidered her choice
of religiods lifestyle, and remained with the parents and
deprogrammers, roller skating, taking trips, shopping, playing soft-
ball, swimming, and picnicking.15° She had many opportunities to
escape, but did not do so. Later, she initiated contact with her boy-
friend, a cult member, with the object of convincing him also to
leave the group. A meeting was arranged, but subsequently the
young woman rejoined the cult and filed a civil suit against her
parents for unlawful imprisonment.151
18 See notes 33-60 and accompanying text supra.
1,7 299 N.W.2d 123 (linn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
148 299 N.W.2d at 127.
149 Id. at 127.
Initially, Susan was unwilling to discuss her involvement; she lay curled in a fetal
position ... plugging her ears and crying while her father pleaded with her to listen
to what was being said. This behavior persisted for two days during which she inter-
mittently engaged in conversation, at one point screaming hysterically and flailing at
her father.
150 Id. "But by Wednesday, Susan's demeanor had changed completely, she was friendly
and vivacious and that night slept in an upstairs bedroom. Susan spent all day Thursday
reading and conversing . . . and on Saturday night went roller-skating. On Sunday she
played softball at a nearby prk ...
182 Id.
1982]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:533
The court found that at least 13 of the young woman's 16 days
outside the cult had been spent voluntarily with her parents and
deprogrammers, 52 and that during her stay in the cult the woman
had acquired a new temporary identity."' 3 The court found that
"cult indoctrination . . . is predicated on a strategy of coercive
persuasion that undermines the capacity for informed consent,""',
that in such settings "consent becomes a function of time,"15 5 and
that other social institutions do not undermine consent so exten-
sively.156 Under these circumstances the court found the young wo-
man's acquiescence "dispositive"' 57 and announced a new test of
consent in cult situations: where the parents remove the child "and
the child at some juncture assents to the actions in question," the
entire course of conduct is deemed consensual and no unlawful im-
prisonment occurs. 5 8 The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 59
IV. OBJECTIONS TO A DuTY OF INFORMED CONSENT
Objections could be directed toward both the feasibility and con-
stitutionality of a requirement of informed consent.
A. Objections Based on Feasibility
Feasibility-related objections to a duty of informed consent in-
clude that religion is not rational and that an interruption to ob-
tain informed consent will render conversion impossible.
215 Id. at 128.
163 Because, it is argued, the cult conditioning process induces dramatic and non-consn-
I'sual change giving rise to a new temporary identity on the part of the individuals
whose consent is under examination, Susan's volitional capacity prior to treatment
may well have been impaired. Following her readjustment, the evidence suggests that
Susan was a different person, "like her old self."
Id. The "it is argued" passage evidently refers to Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1,
at 57. Telephone interview with Jeffrey Brooke, attorney, in Phoenix, Ariz. (Feb. 27, 1981).
154 Id. at 129.
55 Id. at 128: "As such, the question of Susan's consent becomes a function of time."
Compare Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 58 (consent a function of time).
I" "While we acknowledge that other social institutions may utilize a degree of coercion
in promoting their objectives, none do so to the same extent or intend the same conse-
quences. Society, therefore, has a compelling interest favoring intervention." 299 N.W.2d at
129.
Id. at 128.
1 Id. at 129.
159 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
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1. Irrational Nature of Religious Experience. It might be argued
that religion is not rational and that a requirement of informed
consent, which assumes a cognitive model, is therefore inappo-
site.'6 0 Persons do not decide to become adherents to religions by
weighing their respective advantages and disadvantages; they com-
mit themselves out of faith, obedience, and discipleship. 6'
Although some religious groups may view conversion as an invol-
untary act,16 2 it does not follow that they may use methods of in-
duction that abridge consent. The legal system is not required to
adopt the religious group's view of conversion. Allowing religious
proselytizers to define their own limits invites abuse, and is unnec-
essary. In the closely related area of public fundraising, courts have
imposed limits to control religiously based fraud. 63 The require-
ment of interactive consent seems no more onerous than these
other rules and is aimed at protecting an interest of even greater
importance.
2. Disruptive Effect of the Requirement. It could also be argued
that an informed consent requirement would constitute an unrea-
sonable barrier to religious conversion, as any break in the pro-
ceedings would slow the emotional momentum, "destroy the
mood," and make conversion difficult or impossible.""
If the brief delay necessary to give informed consent causes some
persons to decide not to proceed to membership, this is an accept-
able price to pay to protect against the even greater evil of noncon-
sensual conversion. Cult followers may disagree, believing that the
person who rejects conversion loses something of inestimable value.
This weighing of costs and benefits, however, is not theirs to make.
The Constitution directs that choices of religious belief and affilia-
160 Cf. W. JAMES, VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE (1936); . Orro, THE Im. oF TnE
HOLY (1929); P. TLucH, Tim DYNAMICS OF FATh (1957) (religious commitment and belief
not primarily cognitive in nature).
1"1 See note 160 supra.
162 Id.
See notes 40-50 and accompanying text supra; see also notes 174-91 infra.
' Cf. Testimony of Jeremiah Gutman, Hearings held by Senators Dole, Fish, and Zarin-
sky, Washington, D.C., February 9, 1979 (attacking this author's proposal for a requirement
of self-identification by religious converters) [hereinafter cited as Gutmanj; Pro and Con:
Federal Intervention in Cults?, U.S. NEws & Wonw REP., Dec. 11, 1978, at 29, col 2 (inter-
view with Dean M. Kelley) (intervention dangerous and unpredictable); id. at 30, col 2
(opposing cooling-off period).
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tion be made by the individuals directly concerned.165 Others may
disagree with these choices, but are required to respect them.16"
B. Constitutional Objections
Another group of objections attacks the constitutionality of in-
formed consent under the first amendment.
1. Free Exercise of Religion. A requirement of disclosure inter-
feres with the free-exercise right of recruiters by imposing restric-
tions on the way they induct new members. 167 Informed consent
requirements in medicine and human experimentation also inter-
fere with the right of doctors and researchers to practice medicine
or carry out research, but, unlike religion, these areas are not ex-
pressly protected by the Constitution.
Restrictions on religiously motivated conduct are not unconstitu-
tional per se, but are subject to a balancing test in which the court
weighs the state's interest in restricting liberty against the religious
person's or group's interest in performing the acts in question.1"
The religious interest ordinarily will receive broad protection, 16'
but this is lessened to the extent that courts determine the under-
lying motivation to be insincere, 170 or the conduct noncentral 71 to
x6' See notes 33-60 and accompanying text supra.
1k A final objection based on feasibility is that the requirement would be difficult to en-
force, since it could be difficult to tell when, in an ordinary conversation between a con-
verter and a convert, conversion begins. This objection seems easily answered. If a converter
strikes up a conversation, on a bus for example, on a neutral subject, the informed consent
requirement does not arise. As soon as the conversation moves in the direction of interesting
the convert in making contact with the group, see text accompanying notes 74-95 supra, the
offer of disclosure must be made. The line-drawing problems posed seem no more difficult
than they do in medical or psychological experimentation, where it may sometimes be neces-
sary to determine when "treatment" and "experimentation" begin and end.
167 Sincerely motivated religious behavior is protected against arbitrary state interference.
See generally L. TamE, supra note 41, ch. 14 (Rights of Religious Autonomy).
I" See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (balancing test applied in free exercise of religion cases).
16, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943). See generally L. TRmE, supra note 41, §§ 14-6 to -7 at 826-34.
10 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,
34244 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); People v. Woody, 61 Cal.
2d 716, 726, 394 P.2d 813, 820-21, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76-77 (1964).
171 E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716,
394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (peyote as central ingredient of California Indians'
religious system); see also Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 860 (6th Cir. 1967), rev'd on
other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (marijuana not a necessary element of Hindu religion,
hence its use not protected under first amendment).
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the system of belief and practice. For its part, the state's interest
must be legitimate, compelling,172 and achievable by no less oner-
ous means.
17 3
(a) Compelling state interest. Two related state interests sup-
port a requirement of disclosure: the interest in averting noncon-
sensual religious conversion, and the interest in protecting the
public against secondary effects of fraudulent religious proselytiz-
ing. As mentioned earlier, case law and constitutional theory de-
mand that religious choices not be imposed; such choices are left to
the individual.1 7 4 Imposed or nonchosen religiosity is constitution-
ally and morally offensive. L7 5 Protection of free choice in religious
matters would thus appear to constitute a compelling state
interest.
A state may also wish to protect the public against the indigna-
tion and demoralization that can result from deceptive religious re-
cruitment. This interest was cited in dicta in United States v. Bal-
lard17 s and Cantwell v. Connecticut,7 7  and received explicit
protection in more recent cases stemming from Hare Krishna ac-
tivity in airports and at county fairs. Although most of these cases
have centered around dishonest fundraising rather than recruiting
of new members, the state interests are similar in the two areas.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Bar-
ber,178 decided by the Northern District of New York in August
1980, is a recent example. In Barber, the director of a county fair
and others were sued for restricting members of the Hare Krishna
sect from soliciting freely among the public and for confining the
cult's aggressive proselytizing (called "Sankirtan") to a booth.1 79
The sect charged that the restriction was unreasonable and vio-
lated their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
17 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
173 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
174 See notes 34-46, 51-59 and accompanying text supra.
178 Id.
176 322 U.S. 78, 86, 88 (1944) (good or bad faith with which defendants held religious
beliefs properly submitted to jury, although truth or verity of those beliefs could not be so
submitted).
1" 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) ("Nothing we have said is intended even remotely to imply
that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit frauds upon the pub-
lic.... Without a doubt a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation.").
178 506 F. Supp. 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
17 Id. at 150.
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The court found that the sect had engaged in a pattern of decep-
tive practices extending over a period of years. The Krishnas wore
disguises, such as that of Santa Claus, violated their agreement
with the fair officials to wear identification badges, and slurred the
word "Krishna" to make it sound like "Christian. 180 They in-
vented fake purposes and nonexistent programs, told young
couples that they had been selected as the best-looking couple on
the fairgrounds and would receive a prize, and deliberately mis-
counted change by folding bills in half.181 They hid their identifica-
tion badges, or wore badges belonging to other groups.182 They fo-
cused on the handicapped, servicemen, young couples with
children, and others deemed easy "marks,"1 83 and sold records
with photographs of leading recording stars on the cover, although
the contents consisted only of Krishna chants and wails.1 '
The Krishnas defended these practices by characterizing
Sankirtan as their religious duty. Further, even if the member of
the public did not know that he or she was giving to a religious
organization, the member received a spiritual benefit-the greater
the donation, the larger the benefit. 8 5 The Krishnas justified their
deception by religious paternalism: "It is the task of the doctor or
the mother to give ... the medicine because she knows it's best.
So we are approaching conditioned souls because they in their own
right will not turn to Krishna."1 8 Among themselves they de-
scribed nonbelievers as "diseased," "dogs," or "misguided," who
needed to be relieved of their material possessions as the first step
toward attaining spirituality.187
The Krishnas' arguments were unavailing. The court found that
the state has a compelling interest in regulating fraudulent speech,
even under religious auspices.18 Moreover, the booth restriction
was a reasonable means of insuring "authentic[ity] and honest[y]"
"s Id. at 158-63; see also New York Hearings, supra note 8, pt. II at 81.
11 506 F. Supp. at 161-63.
182 Id. at 161-62. "Sadly, still another group that is 'targeted' is the handicapped." Id. at
161 (citing incident with young woman afflicted with cerebral palsy).
18 Id. at 159, 161.
18 Id. at 162 (woman "was startled to discover that her Stevie Wonder album sounded
like a 'cat in heat' ").
18 Id. at 153, 158.
18 Id. at 156.
17 Id. at 158.
18 Id. at 169-71.
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in the Krishnas' dealings with the public.189 Criminal prosecutions
for fraud were not less onerous alternatives; the fluidity and mobil-
ity of the attenders at county fairs made it unlikely that a victim
would remain to press charges.19 0 Other federal decisions have or-
dered similar protection for the public against deceptive religious
fundraising.'91 A common remedy is a requirement that the group
identify itself or wear badges.t
(b) The cult's or recruiter's interest. The interest of religiously
motivated persons or groups in expressing their beliefs by action is
entitled to considerable deference in our constitutional scheme of
values.192 It is not protected absolutely, though courts will seek to
accommodate it when doing so does not require sacrificing an even
greater social value.193 The degree of protection is lessened, how-
ever, when a court finds that the motivation behind the act is in-
sincere or nonreligious,1 ' or when the conduct is not a central ele-
ment or tenet of the group's doctrine or way of life.195
(i) Sincerity. A court could find that a cult's interest in induc-
ing conversion without informed consent is insincere. First, it
could hold that, in this setting, deception and nondisclosure estab-
lish insincerity. 96 In opposition, the recruiter's organization might
argue that its religion compels deceptive recruitment, and that its
19 Id. at 171.
290 Id. at 170-71.
191 E.g., Heffron v. ISKCON, - U.S. , 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Hayne3 v. Metropolitan
Gov't of Nashville, 478 F. Supp. 9 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); ISKCON v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414
(S.D. Ohio 1977).
t Barber was recently reversed, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1981). Shortly afterward, however,
the Supreme Court upheld as a valid time, place, or manner restriction a similar rule in
effect at a state fair in Minnesota. Heffron v. ISKCON, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981).
Heff ron thus reinstates booth rules aimed at regulating disruption and fraud in heavily traf-
ficked, confined public places, id. at 2565 n.13, 2567. See also id. at 2569 (Brennan, J, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); Larson v. Valente, 50 U..LW. 4411, 4416, 4418 n.30
(U.S. April 21, 1982).
19 See sources cited note 169 supra.
191 See sources cited note 168 supra.
19, See sources cited note 170 supra.
191 See sources cited note 171 supra.
19 Thus, the dishonesty of the act would be taken as evidence of its nonreligious orienta-
tion. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (questioning whether ex-
tremely antisocial acts could be religious in any sense of the term). The argument risks
being circular religious acts cannot be dishonest; therefore, if an act is dishonest, it cannot
be religious.
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members are following this mandate sincerely. 197 The court then
would be faced with deciding whether sincere religious deception is
legally protected.198 The weight of case law, reviewed earlier,19
suggests it is not.
Insincerity could also be found if a court determined that the
dominant motive of a group or sect in recruiting new members is
nonreligious-financial or political, for example.2 °0 Conscientious
objector and other exemption-related cases show that an admix-
ture of political or economic motives will weaken a free exercise
claim. 01 Since many cults are intensely preoccupied with money
and power,20 2 and shape their recruiting accordingly,203 a court
could find the requisite sincerity missing.
(ii) Centrality. Another element that courts consider in decid-
107 See, e.g., ISKCON v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); notes 185-87 and
accompanying text supra (members of Hare Krishna sect argued that practice of
"Sankirtan" required that they proselytize aggressively and dishonestly in order to relieve
nonbelievers of burden of material goods and objects that prevented their spiritual
progress).
198 At this point in the inquiry, we are not examining the interest that outsiders have in
not being deceived by dishonest recruiters or in avoiding the harm of imposed religiosity.
See notes 157-73 and accompanying text supra. Rather, we are looking at recruitment from
the perspective of the recruiter and attempting to ascertain the degree of deference that
courts should afford this activity under the constitutional balancing test.
I" See notes 40-59 and accompanying text supra.
200 E.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342-44 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965); Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127
(D.C. Cir. 1957). See also Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146,
1160 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
201 See note 200 supra.
202 Moon's organization, with its publicized ties to a foreign government and possible in-
volvement in political and intelligence operations in this country, seems especially vulnera.
ble. E.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1977, at A9, col. 1 (Fraser Subcommittee identified possible
Korean CIA ties, South Korean official involvement with Unification Church efforts to mo-
bilize public opinion on behalf of President Nixon, then facing impeachment demands);
N.Y. Times, May 25, 1976, at 1, col. 6, at 16, col. 2 (ties with South Korean government,
Korean CIA).
Moon's organization, in common with most other cults, is also intensely interested in
amassing material wealth. E.g., TnmE, June 14, 1976, at 50 (Unification Church considering
purchase of Empire State Building); N.Y. Times, May 25, 1976, at 16, col. 7 (church spent
more than $5 million in purchase of New Yorker Hotel as U.S. headquarters); Dole-Buckley
Meeting Report, supra note 21, pt. 2, at 7, 35, 45, 47 (Scientology training course costs
members $5,000 to $20,000); (Hare Krishna fundraisers berated by their leaders for only
raising $150 per day). See generally Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 44-45
(economic aims).
S03 Heirs and others likely to come into wealth are especially likely to be recruited. See
Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 45 & nn.251-52.
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ing the degree of deference due free exercise claims is centrality.2 04
The closer a course of conduct comes to the theological core of a
religion, the more sympathetically courts will view claims for ex-
emption.20 5 Because regulating nonconsensual recruitment does not
endanger the ability of a religious group to exist, preach, conduct
its ceremonies, or adhere to its system of beliefs, it seems unlikely
that a court would characterize the group's nonconsensual recruit-
ing techniques as a central element or practice. Admittedly, a
group deprived of the ability to recruit nonconsensually loses a
powerful method of increasing its size; however, ordinary means of
recruitment-preaching, revivals, advertising, door-to-door can-
vassing, and handing out leaflets-remain available to it. The
group's interest in using extraordinary rather than ordinary means
of induction would not seem to constitute a "central" element in
the constitutional sense. 06
(c) Least restrictive alternative. If the state's interest is strong
enough to prevail over the group's interests, the means by which it
acts still must be no more onerous than necessary."0
i) Preinduction remedies. It is difficult to conceive of an ef-
fective means of assuring free choice in religious affiliation less on-
erous than a requirement of disclosure. Informed consent of the
proposed interactive variety is less intrusive than that applied in
other areas,2 °0 in that the scope of disclosure is as narrow as the
subject desires. When the target person desires to be converted,
the brief delay required to inform him or her of the group's iden-
tity and religious nature would constitute only a momentary inter-
ruption and might be necessary in any event.
(ii) Postinduction remedies. As was observed earlier, because
the postinduction individual is unlikely to sue for relief, after-the-
fact remedies have doubtful effectiveness unless they provide for
third-party initiative.20 9 The principal methods of enforcing an in-
2'4 See note 171 and sources cited therein supra.
205 Id.
106 See generally Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 46-47 (Centrality-The
Requirement of a Core Belief).
107 See note 173 and accompanying text supra.
'" Informed consent in medical settings requires that the physician give the patient fairly
detailed information about diagnosis, prognosis, and alternative treatments. See generally
sources cited note 32 supra.
11 See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
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formed consent requirement in the postinduction period are rela-
tively onerous, however.2 11 Some courts, therefore, may find un-
remediable a violation of the consent requirement where such
violation has led to a successful conversion. Early case law and le-
gal literature are widely split.
21
2. Excessive Entanglement. A further concern is that a require-
ment of informed consent poses risks of excessive entanglement.
Designed to protect both free exercise and nonestablishment val-
ues, the prohibition against excessive entanglement bars interfer-
ence of religious and state authorities with each other's spheres of
influence.212 In our case, the concern would focus on what has been
called "administrative entanglement"-the unnecessary intrusion
of regulatory procedures into the spiritual realm.213 This entangle-
ment is likely to be found when the government invades an impor-
tant area of church autonomy or governance,21 " acts from no
clearly neutral principle,215 or resorts to dogma or doctrine in
resolving a dispute.216
An informed consent requirement would seem unlikely to con-
travene the rule against excessive entanglement. Unlike interven-
tion in property disputes, defrockment, or challenges among splin-
ter groups, 2 7 a court's enforcement of an informed consent
requirement does not invade an area of church governance or au-
thority; the cult's organizational/doctrinal integrity is not endan-
gered to any significant extent.218 Further, the principle on which
210 See Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 86-88 (proposing guidelines to curb
possible abuses of deprogramming).
211 E.g., United States v. Patrick, No. CR-74-320-S (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 1974) (self-help
deprogramming legitimated by emergent circumstances-defense of necessity upheld); Peo-
ple v. Patrick, 541 P.2d 320 (Colo. 1975) (rejecting deprogramming or its necessity); Del.
gado, Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 85-92 (deprogramming permissible when carried
out with judicial supervision); Note, Conservatorships and Religious Cults: Divining a The-
ory of Free Exercise, 53 N.Y.U. L. l1v. 1247 (1978).
212 E.g., L. TRME, supra note 41, § 14-12, at 865 (requirement is "born of a desire to
minimize. government intrusion into the religious realm" and to insure "that secular and
religious authorities not interfere excessively with one another's respective spheres of choice
and influence").
2" See generally id. at 869-71 (defining administrative entanglement as governmental
practices that coerce or subvert core religious practices).
214 See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
216 See Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
216 E.g., Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976).
21 See cases cited notes 214-16 supra.
218 The church is deprived of a single option-that of obtaihing new members by means
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the court proceeds-that individuals should have the right to
choose their beliefs and affiliations-is religiously neutral 219 Fi-
nally, in finding a breach of informed consent in a given transac-
tion between a believer and a nonbeliever, the court is not required
to decide among competing religious principles or dogmas. The
only matter to be determined is a nonreligious one-whether the
target person received the information he or she was due. The re-
quirement of informed consent would therefore seem unlikely to
contravene the prohibition against excessive entanglement.
3. Disparagement of Religious Belief. Courts, like all arms of
government, are constitutionally barred from questioning the ver-
ity of religious doctrine. The leading case, United States v. Bal-
lard,220 in holding that the truth of religious claims could not be
presented to the jury in a mail fraud case, declared:
Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe
what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of
their religious doctrines or beliefs .... [I]f one could be sent
to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those
teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious
freedom.2 2
Thus, although the Ballard jury properly could decide whether the
defendants believed that they could perform miracles and transmit
messages to and from God, it could not be permitted to decide
whether these beliefs were, in fact, true.
More recently, a California appellate court held that a conserva-
torship order, granted to remove members of the Unification
Church for deprogramming, violated the prohibition against evalu-
ating church doctrine2 22 "When the court is asked to determine
whether that change [of lifestyle] was induced by faith or by coer-
of coercive persuasion-while the individual victim loses many options-the ability to
marry, to follow a career, to associate with friends and family, and to make autonomous
decisions about all these matters.
2' It is religiously neutral in the sense that it neither favors nor impede3 religion, nor
advantages one religion over another. It is thus neutral in the same way in which a require-
ment of informed consent in medical procedures is medically neutral-it favors no theory of
medicine over another, nor seeks to impede or promote medical values. It only aims at giv-
ing patients the choice among the various medical options that may be open to them.
=0 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
$1 Id. at 86-87.
Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977).
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cive persuasion, is it not in turn investigating and questioning the
validity of that faith?
223
Would an informed consent requirement constitute an imper-
missible disparagement of the validity of religious doctrine? To as-
certain whether it would, let us for the moment detach the ques-
tion from the religious context and consider it instead in
connection with consent to medical procedures. Suppose a critic of
informed consent to medical experimentation argued that the re-
quirement derogates medical authority and expertise, questions
the scientific basis of medical judgments, and hence should not be
imposed. This criticism would be seen as fundamentally mis-
guided. Informed consent is required in medical treatments and
human experimentation, not because we fear that the doctor's
judgment is likely to be medically erroneous, but because the deci-
sion to undergo treatment is one that is for the patient alone to
make.
The doctor is competent to tell the patient his or her diagnosis
and prognosis, as well as the various forms of treatment and their
costs and benefits. The doctor's expertise ends at this point. The
patient then must decide whether to incur the costs of treatment
in the hope of achieving certain gains. With regard to this decision,
the physician has no peculiar competence. One patient may prefer
the risk of rapid death at the gain of some days or weeks of mental
clarity, unclouded by drugs or debilitating treatment. Another
might cling to life more tenaciously, willing to risk pain, mental
disorganization, or disfigurement in return for a higher probability
of cure. Respect for human values and personal autonomy dictate
that these decisions be lodged with the individual patient.
The situation is no different with respect to religion. The would-
be converter is free to present religious claims to anyone who will
listen. He or she is free to attempt to convince others to abandon
friends, family, careers, previously held values, loyalties, and prop-
erty, for life in a religious commune or sect. Courts must permit
them to do this; but they need not allow believers to impose life-
styles or values on persons who do not choose them. With respect
to this decision, religious converters have no special competence,
and their interest in a rapid and easy conversion must give way to
the right of potential converts to make their own decisions.
-3 Id. at 988, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
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4. Freedom of Speech. If an informed consent requirement is
constitutionally permissible under the religion clauses, it should
also be permissible under the free speech clause of the first amend-
ment. An informed consent procedure only interferes with the con-
verter's right to speak with would-be converts if they would other-
wise refuse to speak with the recruiter. It is difficult to maintain
that proselytizers have a constitutional right to engage in extended
conversation with persons who do not wish to speak with them.
When a would-be convert does, in fact, wish to speak with the con-
verter and become converted, the obstacle of a momentary delay to
give informed consent would be de minimis.
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CONCLUSION
The current debate about the proselytizing methods of religious
cults is highly polarized. Critics emphasize the dangers of cult
membership and the deviousness of the techniques cults use to in-
duce it, arguing that these factors justify harsh action aimed at the
cults. Cult apologists, on the other hand, argue that no remedy is
necessary or even constitutionally permissible, and that the occa-
sional damaged victim is the price we all pay for religious liberty.
This Article proposes a moderate solution that concedes the
right of cults to exist and to proselytize, but seeks to insure that
the decision to join a cult is made by, not for, the individual con-
vert. The solution, a convert-mediated requirement of informed
consent, would require that religious proselytizers disclose key in-
formation to target persons before initiating conversion attempts.
Most mainstream religious groups, and a few cults, already do this;
the requirement would affect only those that do not. The principal
enforcement mechanism would be private suits for damages.
The proposed requirement, although novel, would be consistent
with the historic values of the religion clauses, as well as with those
of informed consent generally. Moreover, it can be defended
m The requirement does not affect the content of the proselytizing message; it only af-
fects the manner of presentation. The burden it places on proselytizers is alight-a brief
delay for self-identification. Comparable burdens on communications have been upheld, eg.,
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (prohibition of protests by public at a jail); Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (ordinance prohibiting solicitation of business door-to-door
without prior invitation of homeowner). See also Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148
(1943) (dictum): "A city can... by identification devices control the abuse of the privilege
by criminals posing as canvassers."
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against criticism that it is unfeasible and would impermissibly en-
tangle the state with religious affairs. It represents the least oner-
ous method of protecting individuals' decisionmaking authority
and guarding against unwanted or imposed religiosity. It promises
to lessen social strife and self-help. It is a remedy to which courts
and counsel should give careful attention.
